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Abstract: This work investigates the main determinants of capital flows to advanced 
and non-advanced economies in the last decade and assesses whether and how 
unconventional monetary policies played a role as an additional determinant in 
explaining capital flows in this recent experience. We contribute to the literature by 
using an alternative measure of capital flows that allow us to distinguish the investment 
from the disinvestment component of the balance of payments. Our main findings are: 
first, the determinants of capital flows in the pre-crisis period were also significant in 
explaining the capital flows in the post-crisis period, both for advanced and non-
advanced economies. Second, unconventional monetary policies are one additional 
determinant of capital inflows to advanced and non-advanced economies. Finally, we 
find that unconventional monetary policies pushed capital flows to non-advanced 
economies in form of new investment from foreign agents and pulled away capital 
inflows in form repatriation of capital. 
 
Resumo: O objeto de estudo deste trabalho foca-se nos determinantes dos fluxos de 
capitais para economias avançadas e não avançadas durante a última década e de que 
forma é que as políticas monetárias não convencionais contribuíram como fator 
explicativo adicional. A nossa contribuição para a literatura que nos é próxima está 
relacionada com a utilização de uma medida alternativa dos fluxos de capitais que 
permitem distinguir a componente de investimento e de desinvestimento da balança de 
pagamentos. Os nossos resultados são: primeiro, os determinantes dos fluxos de capitais 
para economias avançadas e não avançadas do período pré-crise mantiveram-se 
significativos no período pós-crise. Em segundo lugar, os resultados suportam a 
hipótese de que as políticas monetárias não convencionais agiram como um 
determinante adicional dos fluxos de capital para as economias avançadas e não-
avançadas. Por último, os resultados permitem-nos concluir que as políticas monetárias 
não convencionais surtiram efeito nos fluxos de capital para economias não-avançadas 
através do aumento das decisões de investimento para essas economias ao mesmo 
tempo que contribuíram para a diminuição da repatriação de capital por parte dos 
agentes domésticos. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis (GFC) triggered unusual actions from the major central 
banks as interest rates were successively cut and reached the zero-lower bound. In order 
to boost weak asset markets and stimulate real economic activity, the G4
1
 central banks 
initiated unconventional monetary policies (UMP), which culminated in an outstanding 
expansion of their balance sheets (Fawley & Neely, 2013). The impacts of such UMP 
measures have become increasingly controversial.  
Advanced economies (AE) argue that unusual expansionary monetary policy 
stabilized financial markets and promoted growth; therefore, its global effects must be 
regarded as positive. Even if necessary under certain conditions to boost high-income 
countries, low interest rates during prolonged periods of time may threaten financial 
stability as low risk-free yields could induce a change in the asset allocation of investors 
to non-advanced economies (NAE)
2
 rather than AE (IMF, 2010a and IMF, 2011b). 
Moreover, NAEs’ policy makers made their suspicion about these policies’ negative 
spillovers very clear. When put together with domestic factors, such as growth 
prospects or appreciated currencies, the UMP was feared to create an environment that 
could would affect capital flows, exchange rates, asset prices (Cho & Rhee, 2013), 
generating a decrease in the robustness of their financial systems (Chen, Mancini-
Griffoni, & Sahay, 2014), leading to the expansion of domestic liquidity and potential 
set off credit bubbles, a build-up of imbalances, including the drive up of asset prices to 
unsustainable levels and overheating of the economies, and possible external shocks in 
the form of sudden stops (IMF, 2010a, IMF, 2011b and Powell, 2010).
3
 
There is literature that already assessed similar questions: Fratzscher, Lo Duca, & 
Straub (2013), Ahmed & Zlate (2014), and Burns et al. (2014) concluded for a positive 
effect of UMP on capital inflows both to AE and NAE beyond the global and domestic 
                                                        
1 We will follow the work of Cerutti, Claessens & Ratnovski (2014), Nier, Sedik, & Mondino (2014) and 
Burns, Kida, Lim, Mohapatra, & Stocker (2014) and consider United States, Euro Area, United Kingdom, 
and Japan as the G4 economies. 
2
 Non-advanced economies refers to emerging and developing countries. 
3
 The mechanisms by which capital inflows affect variables as asset prices (see e.g. Kim & Yang , 2011, 
and Taguchi, Sahoo, & Natara, 2015), house price (see e.g. Tillmann, 2013, Aizenman & Jinjarak, 2009, 
and Jinjarak & Sheffrin, 2011), and credit growth (see e.g. Lane & McQuade, 2013, and Arslan & Taskin, 
2014) is object of an extensive literature.  
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conditions, even though these works employed different measures of UMP. The 
contribution of our work to this literature is on the use of the four-way decomposition, 
an alternative measure of capital inflows proposed by Janus & Riera-Crichton (2013). 
This measure intends to distinguish the investment and disinvestment components of 
the balance of payments. By doing so, it could help to correctly classify disinvestments 
as outflows rather than negative inflows and consequently help policymakers design 
and monitor effective capital controls (Janus & Riera-Crichton, 2013). Additionally, 
this decomposition increases the ability to predict financial crises comparing with the 
study of financial crises through net and gross capital flows (Janus & Riera-Crichton, 
2013) as well as is helpful to understand which components affect output growth the 
most during financial crises (Janus & Riera-Crichton, 2014). 
This work aims to answer the following three questions (i) Which factors influenced 
capital to flow to economies during the last decade? (ii) Did the determinants that 
explain the capital flows in the pre-crisis period also explain the capital flows in the 
post-crisis period? (iii) To which extent are unusual monetary policies influencing 
capital flows? 
Revealing some results, our study allowed us to conclude that for NAE the 
determinants of net inflows are similar to the determinants of gross inflows. 
Additionally, our results support the idea that the recent experience of AE and NAE was 
different. However, proceeding with an estimation of the model including the two 
groups does not allow the model to capture both experiences in the most adequate way. 
In addition, we found empirical support for the hypothesis that UMP pushed capital to 
flow to NAE, with capital flowing to those economies through the increase of 
investment decisions of foreign agents. However, the four-way decomposition produces 
results that allow us to conclude that UMP pulled capital inflows in form of capital 
repatriation from national agents. 
The rest of our work is organized in the following way: chapter 2 presents a succinct 
exposition of capital flow’s recent experience; chapter 3 presents the literature review 
regarding monetary policy and the determinants of capital flows; chapter 4 will deal 
with the definition of the econometric model and other methodological considerations; 
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on chapter 5 we will present the results, discuss them, and briefly point to some 
robustness exercises we have done; chapter 6 concludes the work. 
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2. Recent experience on capital flows 
Based on what captured the attention of policymakers and on the focus institutions 
that support policymakers’ decisions, we will follow IMF (2011a), and compute and 
analyze the capital inflows for the most representative economies of Asia, Latin 
America, Emerging Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) as well as gross capital 
outflows for AE.  
Regarding NAE, this option tends to be close to Ahmed & Zlate (2014) who 
selected the largest capital inflows recipients in Latin America and Asia for their 
sample, excluding world financial centers as Hong Kong and Singapore. The main 
difference is related with the inclusion of EMEA’s countries: Ahmed & Zlate (2014) 
argue their focus on concerns such as real exchange rate appreciation pressures, and 
spillover effects of AE’ expansionary policies do not apply to emerging Europe 
economies. However, this region captured attention in the  literature regarding the 
potential vulnerabilities due to the type of flows that flooded the region – mainly bank 
and portfolio flows – which are more prone to raise a scenario in which investors 
quickly reverse them (IMF, 2011b). Therefore, taking into account the latter argument 
we will proceed to include EMEA economies. 
In a different way, IMF (2014e) focus on the top eight receivers
4
 of net capital flows 
which account for almost 90% of capital inflows (or 75% of gross capital inflows) to 
emerging economies in the 2010Q1 – 2012Q4 period. From these emerging economies, 
we do not include China due to data restrictions. The remaining economies are part of 
our sample. 
5
 
Figure 1
6
 presents the gross capital inflows for the selected NAE during the period 
2005Q1-2014Q4. One can see four different phases: i) a sharp reduction in the last 
quarter of 2008; ii) a recovery stage during the beginning of 2009; iii) a reduction in the 
                                                        
4
 Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and Turkey. 
5
 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Phillipines, 
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
6 Figures 1 to 2 and A1 to A3 represent the gross capital inflows to non-advanced economies and gross 
outflows from the advanced economies in % of the GDP, which are calculated with data extracted from 
table A1. 
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last two quarters of 2011; and finally iv) a substantial decline during the first two 
quarters of 2013. 
Following the global financial crisis in the third quarter of 2008 tight financial 
conditions around the world triggered an increase in risk aversion around the globe 
leading to a retrenchment in private capital flows and a repatriation of funds to mature 
markets (ECB, 2009). This effect was amplified by the decrease of growth prospects in 
NAEs given the transmission, through the financial and trade channels, of the economic 
performance of U.S. economy as well as European and advanced Asian (IMF, 2009a). 
In conclusion, a sharp reduction of capital inflows to emerging and developing 
economies prevailed in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 (figure A1 
to A3 in annex) reflecting market concerns regarding both internal and external 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities of NAE, namely currency mismatches, weak risk 
management and fast credit growth (IMF, 2009a & IMF, 2009b). This decrease was 
driven mainly by both portfolio and other inflows and affected emerging Asian 
economies more severely and Latin American and EMEA economies in a lower degree. 
In all the referred cases, portfolio and bank flows drove the behavior of capital flows, 
reflecting favorable conditions for carry-trade activity such as better economic 
prospects (ECB, 2010b). On the contrary, foreign direct investment inflows remained 
stable during the turmoil. 
After the sharp decrease in the last quarter of 2008, the subsequent period registered 
a recovery of capital inflows to NAE as a consequence of the improvement in these 
economies prospects’, the reduction in interest rates in AE and the increase in investors’ 
risk appetite (IMF, 2010b). These factors were feared to create a harmful environment 
which would drive capital flows to emerging and developing economies and could lead 
to asset price bubbles, asset price appreciation, and surges in inflows when external 
conditions are tightened (IMF, 2010b, IMF, 2010c). Beyond the possible damage these 
flows could inflict to those economies, persistent private inflows could also have strong 
potential consequences on global financial markets (ECB, 2011). In the last quarter of 
2009, gross capital flows to Latin America, Emerging Asia, and EMEA accounted for 
almost the double of the values of the retrenchment episode and close to the values 
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registered during the period from 2005 to 2008. The investor’s portfolio reallocation 
into NAE was driven by portfolio and other flows principally on Asia and Latin 
America. This reallocation occurred while growth and yield differentials remained large 
enough to influence investor’s decisions (IMF, 2011b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International spillovers from the Eurozone crisis regarding the concerns related with 
the interaction between sovereign and financial sector risks (ECB, 2011) affected the 
behavior of capital flows to NAE during the last two quarters of 2011 (Ahmed & Zlate, 
2014). Asia and EMEA economies were the ones where greater reductions of capital 
flows were registered, namely related with bank flows and latterly portfolio flows. Latin 
American economies registered a smoother reduction, which was a consequence of a 
sudden stop of portfolio flows for this region. 
Regarding the fourth phase, it occurred as the market reacted to the possibility of 
tapering by the FED raised by its chairman Ben Bernanke which induced an increase of 
long-term interest rates both on U.S. and other AE (IMF, 2013b). This action interacted 
with internal and external vulnerabilities in NAE, which investors overlooked during 
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Figure 1 - Capital inflows to non-advanced economies 
Direct investment Other investment Portfolio investment Gross capital inflows
  
7 
 
the period of better growth performance when comparing with AE  and higher risk 
appetite (IMF, 2014a, IMF, 2014b), and provoked adjustments in capital flows, asset 
prices, and national currencies (IMF, 2014e). Even if the adjustment did not configure a 
sustainable reversal of capital flows during the following period, it could be interpreted 
as a signal that investors would rebalance their portfolios on a scenario of higher 
interest rates in AE and higher volatility of capital flows (IMF, 2013c). Smoother 
decreases of capital inflows were registered in both Latin America and Asia contrasting 
with the pronounced reduction in the case of EMEA.  
In addition to describing the recent experience of NAE, we analyze the gross capital 
outflows from the AE. We follow Fratzscher (2012) and analyze the capital outflows 
from AE through figure 2.
7
 One can see four different phases: i) a sharp reduction of 
capital outflows during 2008; ii) a recovery stage during the beginning of 2009; iii) a 
reduction in the last two quarters of 2011; and finally iv) a decline during the first two 
quarters of 2013. 
This group of economies experienced a sharp decline in gross capital outflows 
during 2008, with other investment accounting for the greatest of this behavior. In the 
last quarter of 2008, gross capital outflows from AE registered -6.87% of the GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 Canada, Euro Area, Japan, United Kingdom, and Unites States. 
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Figure 2 - Capital Outflows from Advanced Economies 
Direct investment Other investment
Portfolio investment Gross capital outflows
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The sharp contraction in the last quarter of 2008 was followed by a recovery of 
gross capital outflows in the subsequent periods accounting for 3.6% of GDP in the 
second quarter of 2010. The recovery was a consequence of the consecutive increase in 
portfolio investment and other investment outflows. During 2008, FDI outflows 
remained quite stable, being the only component that recorded positive outflows 
throughout the period of decline in capital outflows. 
 During 2009 and 2010, the capital outflows in AE recorded an increase namely 
regarding portfolio and other investment. This behavior of capital outflows of AE 
mirrored the increase of capital inflows to NAE. During the last two quarters of 2011 
and the last two quarters of 2013, gross capital outflows from AE decreased as result of 
the Eurozone crisis and the tapering talk by the Federal Reserve (Fed), respectively. 
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3. Literature review on monetary policy and capital flows 
3.1 Implementation of monetary policy 
Prior to the GFC, monetary policy was conducted in a relatively predictable and 
systematic way (IMF, 2013a), following a wide variety of macroeconomic indicators 
that could be transformed in the Taylor rule (Jayce, Miles, Scott, & Vayanos, 2012). 
During that period, although several studies were undertaken towards improve our 
understanding about the channels by which monetary policy operates, the process by 
which these policies affect the economy was long, variable and included several 
uncertain lags (ECB, 2000). Thus, the precise effects of monetary policy were difficult 
to predict (ECB, 2000). 
[Figure A4] 
As a monopolist of base money, the central bank can fully determine the official 
interest rates. Generally, “monetary policy mainly acts by setting a target for the 
overnight interest rate in the interbank money market and adjusting the supply of central 
bank money to that target through open market operations.” (Smaghi, 2009).  The 
manipulation of short-term interest rate affects initially financial market conditions as 
changes of the policy interest rate affect the money market interest rate, asset prices, 
exchange rate, general liquidity and credit conditions in the economy (ECB, 2000). In a 
later moment, changes in financial conditions lead to changes in nominal spending by 
households and firms (ECB, 2000). Additionally, when central banks affect short-term 
interest rates the policy affects market expectations regarding longer-term interest rates 
as long-term interest rates depend in part on market expectations about the future course 
of short-term rates (ECB, 2000). Moreover, monetary policy may also influence the 
actual behavior of economic agents: consumption and investment decisions in general 
take into account the expectations of future inflation and general economic 
developments. Because the manipulation of short-term interest rate affects the general 
price level in the long-run, it will consequently affect the conditions in which agents 
decide their consumption and investment (ECB, 2000). 
However, this way of conducting monetary policy is limited by the zero lower 
bound: the successive reductions in interest rate can, potentially, lead the central bank to 
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a scenario where it “can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate 
reductions and must rely instead on non-standard policy alternatives” (Bernanke, 
Reinhart, & Sack, 2004). In such a scenario, reserves at central bank and short term 
assets are nearly perfect substitutes which means the central bank’s monetary policies 
through those instruments are nearly irrelevant (IMF, 2013a). 
When the zero lower bound is reached, and consequently the manipulation of short 
term rates is severely limited, there are policy alternatives so central banks are still able 
to provide additional monetary stimulus (Bernanke et al., 2004). Following Bernanke & 
Reinhart (2004), it is possible to group the non-standard measures into three distinct 
groups: 1) shape of public expectations through communication regarding the future 
path of interest rates, 2) changes in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet; 
and 3) increases of the central bank’s balance sheet. Even if these measures are different 
in their nature, their main goal is common: to improve financing conditions beyond the 
manipulation of short-term interest rates by targeting the cost and supply of external 
finance to banks, households, and non-financial companies (Smaghi, 2009). The details 
of these non-standard measures, especially the increase of central bank’s balance sheet, 
vary across central banks and depend, naturally, on the structures and characteristics of 
the respective economies and the motivations of each action (Fawley & Neely, 2013). 
Exploring the different ways by which central banks could increase their balance 
sheets, we will follow Smaghi (2009) and distinct the forms central banks could expand 
their balances: 
Quantitative easing: describes the set of policies that aim to increase the magnitude 
of central bank’s liabilities (Neely, 2010). When doing so, central banks can purchase 
any type of assets from anybody; traditionally, quantitative easing focuses on buying 
longer-term government bonds. There are two main reasons for this: the first one is that 
sovereign yields are used by the private sector as a benchmark to the issuance of 
securities. If the acquisition of bonds succeeds in lowering sovereign yields, it would be 
expected yields of private securities to decrease. The second reason is that if long-term 
yields decrease, that could affect long-term agents’ decisions, namely long-term 
investment (Smaghi, 2009). 
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This type of expansion of the balance sheet is highly dependent on the action of the 
private sector after they sell the assets they possess. If the additional liquidity is remains 
within the financial sector, quantitative easing may be ineffective (Smaghi, 2009). 
Credit easing: is intended to repair liquidity shortages in specific market segments 
through a mix of loans, not only for financial institutions but also for the household and 
the business sectors, and the acquisition of assets. The effectiveness of the operations 
depend on the importance of those market segments in financing households and the 
business sector, which is a specific characteristic of each economy, and on how those 
monetary actions will improve the functioning of private credit markets. 
Indirect Quantitative easing/Credit easing (Enhanced credit support): an alternative 
way to increase the balance sheet, which does not imply the central bank to hold the 
assets until maturity, is lending directly to banks at increased maturities against 
collateral that includes assets whose markets are temporarily impaired. If these 
operations are able to satisfy banks’ financing needs, it could happen that each action 
affects directly the yield curve over the action horizon, particularly if the operations are 
conducted at a fixed rate, full allotment. It should be noted that the monetary base is 
determined endogenously by the banking system depending on the banks’ preference 
for liquidity. Additionally, by enlarging the accepted collateral, the financing conditions 
by banks to those sectors are facilitated as is also facilitated the creation and trading of 
the assets whose market is impaired. 
But which are the channels through which UMP works? To assess this question I 
refer to the work of Bowdler & Radia (2012). Regarding this question, they explore 
three main channels: portfolio rebalancing, liquidity, and policy signaling. 
Portfolio rebalancing: by acquiring assets from the private sector, the central bank 
affects the portfolio decisions of those who sell the assets, giving them money in 
exchange of the assets. If the assets the private sector sells and the money received are 
viewed as perfect substitutes, the transmission mechanism ends here because the 
portfolio balance remains and agents will not need to rebalance it. Because at the zero 
lower bound money and short-term bonds are perfect substitutes, central banks focus on 
buying other assets that are less substitutes for money. And this is where the portfolio 
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rebalancing channel enters. If two assets are imperfect substitutes, changes in the 
outstanding amounts of both will induce agents to rebalance their portfolio with that 
action having consequences on asset prices. On a zero lower bound scenario, the 
objective is that agents rebalance their portfolios into assets with longer maturities in 
order to decrease the price of those assets. The effectiveness of this channel is surely 
dependent on the degree of substitutability between assets: the higher the 
substitutability, the less effective the mechanism will be. 
There is some literature regarding the effect of the balance sheet expansion on long-
term yields. D’Amico & King (2013) study the effect of the first round of the large 
scale asset purchase (LSAP) program on the US Treasury yield curve and concluded the 
program contributed to a persistent decline of 30 basis points of the yield curve and a 
temporarily reduction of 3.5 basis points in the sector where the purchases are made, 
both effects concentrated on medium term maturities. Wu (2014) examines the 
mechanisms through which unconventional measures affect long-term interest rates and 
concludes LSAP programs lowered long-term yields. However, the effectiveness is not 
the same in all the programs, being similar during the first round of quantitative easing 
(QE), the second round of QE, and Operation Twist and decreasing during the third 
round of QE. This article also contributes to the literature regarding the portfolio 
rebalancing channel by concluding that continuing LSAP programs enhanced the 
credibility of forward guidance. 
Despite the fact that generally the literature focuses on US programs, there are some 
studies on the effects of the policies of other central banks, such as the ECB (ECB). 
Szczerbowicz (2012) assesses the effects of ECB’s UMP between 2007 and 2012 on 
bank and government borrowing costs through an event-based regression. The 
Securities Market Programme (SMP) proved to be the most efficient tool in order to 
lower sovereign spreads with its effects going from 35 basis points (Italy) to 476 
(Greece), hitting more effectively the peripheral euro-area economies. Furthermore, 
Eser & Schwaab (2013) found a lower but significant impact of SMP on 5-year maturity 
bond yields from 1 to 21 basis points, with Greece being the country that benefited the 
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most. The precise impact, the authors concluded, depends on the size and market 
conditions as well as on the default risk. 
Even if the main literature regarding quantitative easing’s portfolio rebalancing 
channel concentrates on bond yields, Jarrow & Li (2012) purpose is to estimate the 
impact of quantitative easing on U.S. interest rate term structure. Their main 
conclusions is that short and medium term forward rates up to 12 years decreased, with 
the magnitude of the effect decreasing as the maturity increases. Contrary to the Fed’s 
intentions, the long term structure was not affected. Finally, the results regarding the 
effect of 2008-2011 monetary policy on bond yields are consistent with those presented 
in the existing literature as D’Amico & King (2013) and Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011): the actions from the Fed caused a persistent decrease in bond yields 
at all the maturities. 
Liquidity channel: during times of financial stress, agents could ask for a liquidity 
premium to compensate for the risk of holding assets that could not have an active 
market where the assets could be transacted. Theoretically, asset purchases by central 
banks are intended to reduce the liquidity premium. The impact should be higher as less 
liquid is the market. We present the work of Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, & Sack (2011) 
and Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) as empirical studies regarding this 
specific channel: on the one hand, the first study concludes that the actions from the Fed 
improved liquidity in mortgage-backed securities market by providing a consistent 
source of demand; on the other hand, the latter work concludes the same actions 
lowered credit risk premium in corporate bond markets. 
Signaling channel: revealing information about the future path of monetary policy 
could influence long-term interest rates, as the monetary authority signals the market 
that it expects policy rates to remain lower for a certain period of time. When combined 
with asset purchases, this channel may help the authority to demonstrate its 
commitments. Neely (2010) studies the possibility that LSAP announcements affected 
US long-term interest rates concluding for a substantial reduction of interest rates in the 
period following the announcements. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
conclude QE operates through the signaling channel, with larger effects on medium 
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term than long-term yields. During QE1, the signaling channel contributed to a 
reduction of 20 to 40 basis points on 5 to 10 years yield bonds. When looking to the 
second action of QE, signaling channel is found to have lowered 5 years bond yields by 
11 to 16 basis points and lowered 10 years yield bonds by 7 to 11 basis points. Bauer & 
Rudebusch (2014) provide evidence that this channel had positive and statistically 
significant effects on the first FED’s LSAP program by lowering the long term interest 
rates. These findings concur with those of Wu (2014), who contributes by concluding 
that continuing LSAP programs enhance the credibility of forward guidance. 
However, there is also literature on possible perverse effects of signaling channel on 
monetary policy’s efficiency. If agents put too much trust on the announcements and 
ignore other relevant information that might influence the future path of interest rates, 
those announcements could be interpreted within an herding and overreaction 
environment (Kool & Thornton, 2012). 
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3.2 Monetary policies 
In this section we will summarize the differences on the monetary actions
8
 in the 
post-crisis period carried out by the central banks of the G4.
9
 The objective is to reflect 
why we argue that it may be adequate to capture those actions by the variation of the 
balance sheet. 
The four central banks adapted their UMP to the structure of their economies 
(Fawley & Neely, 2013). Even if the objective was to provide liquidity and support the 
financial system, the framework of each action and its implementation reflected the 
different specificities of the economy. Briefly, it can be said that both the program of 
the Fed and that of the BoE (BoE) differed from those of the ECB and that of the BoJ 
(BoJ) given the importance of the bond market in financing the economy in the former 
group comparing with the importance banking system in the latter group (Fawley & 
Neely, 2013). 
Following the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy in September 2008, monetary 
institutions promptly faced a scenario of illiquidity and increase in risk premium. The 
first action on September, 18, was the expansion of the foreign exchange swap lines by 
the Fed – that was carried out on October, 13, in coordination with the ECB, the BoE 
and the BoJ among others – with the objective of supplying foreign currencies to US 
institutions and providing US dollars to external institutions. This action was latterly 
revised and changed in order to accommodate any quantity of funds demanded. In the 
same period, the Federal Reserve created the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP), 
the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, which lent money to banks for the 
purpose of purchasing high-quality ABCP. Additionally, the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility was created with the objective of acquiring high-quality commercial 
paper and so was the Term Auction Facility with the objective of providing liquidity to 
                                                        
8
 The announcements referred during this chapter can be consulted on table A2 to A5. In footnote will be 
referenced announcements that complement those presented on the tables with additional information. 
9
 We focus on these four economies for several motives: firstly, these economies play a central role on the 
direction of capital flows as they act as financial centers, intermediating funds globally. Additionally, 
since G4 financial systems intermediate much of the global credit, monetary actions in these economies 
with impact on funding conditions will affect funding conditions globally. Furthermore, the central banks 
of these economies are among the ones which pursued the most accommodative monetary policies in the 
post-crisis period as we review here. Finally, these economies represent four of the five largest economies 
in the world, considering by monetary zone. 
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depository institutions in exchange for a broader set of collateral in times at which 
interbank markets were under stress. On November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve 
announced that it would start to purchase $100 billion in government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) debt and $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by 
GSEs. The objective was said to reduce the cost of credit and, at the same time, increase 
the availability of credit for those who intended to purchase houses, which would 
consequently improve housing market and financial markets in a broader (Fawley & 
Neely, 2013). 
During the same period, on October 15, 2008, the ECB implemented the Fixed Rate 
Full-Allotment program in order to provide liquidity to the European banking system 
against a broader set of eligible collateral. This action differed from the previous way of 
conducting monetary policy that was intended to offer funds at rates determined by the 
bidding process.  Despite the Fixed Rate Full-Allotment, the interbank market 
continued to face concerns regarding the counterparty risk by early 2009 (Fawley & 
Neely, 2013). On May 7, 2009, the ECB reduced its main refinancing rate to 1%, 
introduced 12-month long-term refinancing operations, and introduced the Covered 
Bond Purchase Program. Regarding to the latter action, it must be said that given its 
characteristics “Issuing long-maturity covered bonds helps banks to alleviate the 
maturity mismatch they usually face between the long-term loans they hold as assets 
and the on-demand deposits they hold as liabilities.” (Fawley & Neely, 2013). Given the 
stress this market registered following the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers and the 
importance of the market on funding the European banking system, the ECB announced 
the purchase of €60 billion of covered bonds. 
In order to counteract the worsening of the financial conditions that small and large 
firms faced during the last quarter of 2008, the BoJ announced on December 2, 2008, 
that it would start to provide unlimited credit to banks at the uncollateralized overnight 
call rate - which at that time was 0.3%. Additionally, the Bank eased the quality of 
corporate debt accepted as collateral from “A-rated or higher” to “BBB-rated or 
higher”. Like the Fixed Rate Full-Allotment program carried out by the ECB, these 
actions emphasize the importance of the banking system in financing the Japanese 
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economy. Additionally, on December 19, 2008, the BoJ decided to decrease the 
overnight rate to 0.1% as well as to expand the outright purchases of Japanese 
government bonds and introduce additional measures to facilitate corporate financing. 
On January 22 and February 19, the BoJ announced reverse-action purchases of ¥3 
trillion in commercial paper and ¥1 trillion in corporate bonds, respectively. 
On January 19, 2009, Her Majesty’s Treasury announced the Asset Purchase 
Facility that was intended to be operated by the BoE. This facility was designed to 
achieve two distinct objectives: to increase the availability of corporate credit, by 
reducing the illiquidity of the underlying instruments and to provide monetary stimulus 
in order to achieve the inflation target. Because the £50 billion purchase of high quality 
private sector assets was financed by the issuance of Treasury bills, these actions did 
not increase the monetary base. On March 5, the BoE announced that the Asset 
Purchase Facility would start to be financed by central bank reserves rather than by the 
issuance of treasury bills and that the increase in the monetary base would be £75 
billion and later of £200 billion. The Bank directed the purchase of assets to medium 
and long-term assets of illiquid markets. 
Summarizing, although each of the central banks announced the outright asset 
purchases in the post-crisis period, the ECB and the BoJ only acquired a small amount 
of a particular asset (Fawley & Neely, 2013). These central banks acted mainly through 
loans to their banking system; on the contrary, the Fed and the BoE implemented large 
acquisitions of assets. The improvement of market conditions led central banks to phase 
out their programs (Fawley & Neely, 2013). 
However, the European sovereign debt crisis and deflationary trends in the US, the 
UK and Japan revived the necessity to employ UMPs. In May 2010, the evolution of the 
sovereign debt crisis disrupted European financial markets. In order to ensure the depth 
and the liquidity of public and private debt securities markets, the ECB announced on 
May 10, 2009, the Securities Market Programme. The objective of this action was to 
ensure the adequate functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and 
consequently ensure that the ECB was able to achieve the goal of price stability by 
acquiring government debt in the secondary market. Those purchases were intended to 
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be sterilized which prevented the program to increase the monetary base. On October 6, 
2011, a second round of the Covered Bond Purchase Program and additional 12-month 
long-term refinancing operations were announced. Later, on December 8, the ECB 
announced that it would conduct for the first time long-term refinancing operations with 
maturity of 36 months in order to support bank lending and liquidity in the money 
market. On September 6, 2012, the ECB announced the Outright Monetary Transactions 
to replace the Securities Market Programme. The new program was still intended to 
work through the sterilized acquisition of sovereign debt in the secondary market but it 
became conditional to a European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability 
Mechanism program. In order to support bank lending to households and non-financial 
institutions, the ECB announced on June 5, 2014, targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations with a maturity of nearly 4 years. Additionally, it was announced that 
sterilizations of the operations under the Securities Market Programme were suspended. 
Three months later, on September 4, 2014, the ECB reflected the importance of the 
asset-backed securities’ market on financing the European economy and announced an 
asset-backed securities purchase program. And a third edition of the covered bond 
purchase programme was also announced. At that announcement the measures were 
said to be expected to have a sizeable impact on the balance sheet of the central bank. 
Regarding the BoJ, on December 1, 2009, it was announced that the Fixed-Rate 
Operations would replace the Special Funds Supplying Operations. The main 
differences between the two actions lay on the fixed amount of available loans on the 
announced program and the broader class of eligible collateral (Fawley & Neely, 2013). 
The objective of this action was to promote a reduction of long-term interest rates in 
order to support Japan’s growth and avoid the deflationary trend. Additionally, on June 
15, 2010, the BoJ announced the full details of the Fund-Provisioning Measure to 
Support Strengthening the Foundations for Economic Growth program. 
10
 The objective 
of the program was to make long-term funds available at low rates to those private 
financial institutions that would be looking forward to lend those amounts to the 
corporate sector. On June 14, 2011, and March 13, 2012, the BoJ decided to expand this 
                                                        
10
 The announcement could be seen at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2010/k100615.pdf 
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program given the positive impact of the previous action in promoting investment with 
capacity to increase the potential growth. The total amount available for private 
financial institutions increased from ¥3 billion in the first program to ¥5.5 billion in the 
latter. Furthermore, the BoJ announced additional purchases of ¥60 trillion in Japanese 
governmental bonds and Treasury bills and ¥1 trillion in private assets as part of its 
APP. On January 22, 2013, the BoJ decided to implement a price stability target at 2% 
in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index. In order to 
achieve this objective as soon as possible the BoJ announced that it would pursue 
aggressive monetary easing. This program was denominated Quantitative and 
Qualitative Monetary Easing and was oriented to increase the monetary base at an 
annual pace of ¥60 to ¥70 billion and to acquire Japanese governmental bonds at an 
annual pace of ¥50 billion and Japan real estate investment trusts at the amount of ¥30 
billion per year. 
Slower recovery in output and employment and subdued inflation trends induced the 
Federal Reserve to act on August 10, 2010, by maintaining the size of the balance sheet 
and reinvesting the principal payments of the long-term asset purchases. On September 
21, 2010, the Federal Reserve enhanced its intention to reinvest the principal payments 
due to expectation that inflation would remain subdued for a long period of time. 
Additionally, on November 3, 2010, it was announced that the Federal Reserve would 
acquire $600 billion of long-term Treasury bills in order to support the real activity and 
to drive inflation to the stability path consistent with its mandate. These actions were 
designed to achieve its objectives through the reduction of long-term interest rates. On 
the second semester of 2011, economic growth on the U.S. remained slow with the 
overall labor market conditions continuing to be weak. In order to seek maximum 
employment, the Federal Reserve announced, on September 21, what has been called 
the “Operation Twist”: it would purchase $400 billion of Treasury securities with 
remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and would sell the same amount of 
Treasuries securities in its possession with remaining maturities of 3 years or less. This 
action was intended to enhance the decrease of long-term interest rates as well as ease 
broader financial market conditions. On June 20, 2012, the Federal Reserve announced 
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that it would enhance the acquisition of long-term Treasury assets at the same time that 
would sell the same amount of short-term Treasury assets. On September 13, the 
Federal Reserve made clear that economic growth would not be strong enough to 
generate sustained improvement in labor market conditions without further policy 
accommodation. Additionally, the strains in global financial markets were said to 
continue to retard world economic growth. In order to boost economic growth and help 
ensure that inflation would be consistent with its mandate, the Federal Reserve 
announced further easing of monetary policy by purchasing additional agency 
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. This detail is the main 
difference regarding the previous programs: the Federal Reserve committed itself to a 
pace of monthly purchases rather than a total amount of purchases (Fawley & Neely, 
2013). The purchases were to be undertaken as long as the conditions of the labor 
market would not improve substantially. For instance, this action would be reversed 
when the economic activity as well as the unemployment would recover consistently – 
that is what was firstly announced on December 18, 2013, and was systematically 
communicated until December 2014. The consistent improvement in economic activity 
and labor market conditions were sufficient to decrease the monthly purchase of 
mortgage-backed securities from $40 to $5 and the monthly acquisition of long-term 
Treasury securities from $45 billion to $10 billion. 
Regarding the BoE, the apprehension that the inflation target would not be achieved 
instigated the Bank to react by announcing on October 6, 2011, an increase from £200 
billion to £275 billion on the asset purchases as part of the Asset Purchase Facility. On 
February 9 and July 5, 2012, the BoE further increased the amount of purchases to £325 
and £375, respectively. Additionally, in order to ease the flow of credit through the 
banking system, which remained impaired in 2012, the BoE announced on July 13, 
2012, and expanded on April 24, 2013, the Funding Lending Scheme. The objective of 
this action was to reduce the price at which financial institutions finance themselves, 
and therefore reduce the price at which those institutions finance households and the 
corporate sector. 
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To sum up, from 2008 to 2014 there were two distinct phases during which central 
banks carried out UMPs. Firstly, in order to calm and increase the liquidity in financial 
markets, from 2008 until 2010 and after the zero lower bound was reached, these central 
banks acted through the purchase of assets, with this policy being more important in the 
case of the Federal Reserve and of the BoE, and through the increase of the available 
amounts to lend to the financial institutions, namely in the case of the ECB and the BoJ. 
Secondly, from 2010 until 2014, the central banks carried out UMPs for different 
reasons. It is possible to categorize these reasons in two different groups: actions that 
aimed to deal with the Eurozone crisis and actions aiming to support economic growth 
and ensuring that inflation meets the defined target. The ECB focused on restoring the 
functioning of securities market and supporting the banking system given its importance 
in financing the economy. The Federal Reserve, the BoJ and BoE eased their monetary 
policy in order to prevent disinflationary trends and support economic growth.  
Even if those policies were conducted with different motives, they generally 
resulted on the expansion of the central banks’ balance sheet as demonstrated by 
Gambacorta, Hofmann & Peersman (2014) and Kozicki, Santor, & Suchanek (2011). 
During this period, the increase of the balance sheet replaced short-term interest rates as 
the main monetary policy instrument. As argued by Gambacorta et al. (2014), given the 
evolution of the central banks’ balance sheet after short-term interest rates reached the 
zero lower bound and the strong cross-country commonality of central banks from AE 
in conducting the monetary policy after the global financial crisis through balance 
sheets, we consider that it is adequate to capture those policies on a broader way 
through the evolution of the aggregate balance sheet of these central banks. 
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3.3 Capital flows 
The free movement of capital across countries is beneficial as it promotes the 
productivity and growth of those who receive those flows and allows countries to 
anticipate future increases on GDP (Epstein, 2009), contributing for a possible 
acceleration of the convergence between capital-poor countries and capital-rich 
countries (Lucas, 1990), and concedes the opportunity to apply the surplus of saving on 
countries with higher return on capital (Kose, Prasad, Roggof, & Wei, 2009). At a 
micro economic level, capital flows might be able to enhance the efficiency of resource 
allocation and the competitiveness of the domestic financial system (IMF, 2012). 
Moreover, opening the capital account may act as a way to discipline policymakers and 
their actions regarding macroeconomic policies as the liberalization influences 
sovereign risk premium when fiscal policies tend to be unsustainable (Montiel, 2014). 
Nonetheless, the literature broadly agrees that large capital flows can be the starting 
point for excessive risk taking by financial institutions and for macroeconomic 
imbalances, including increase of macroeconomic volatility, and additional 
vulnerability to crises (IMF, 2012). 
The study of the determinants of capital flows and its volatility is essential so 
policymakers can understand and evaluate the negative effects of international capital 
mobility (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2007). In any situation, policymakers 
should evaluate the country’s specific vulnerabilities and examine what the potential 
policy response to a tightening of global financial conditions should be. Countries with 
strong fundamentals and investors’ confidence “(…) may be able to rely on market 
mechanisms, countercyclical macroeconomic and prudential policies to deal with a 
retrenchment of foreign capital” (Burns et al., 2014). Contrarily, countries that carry 
weaker fundamentals and external imbalances may be forced to tighten their fiscal and 
monetary policies in order to reduce their financing needs. 
There is a continuing debate in the literature about the driving forces of capital 
flows, with this discussion being one of the most important issues in the international 
macroeconomics literature (Alfaro et al., 2007). Generally, the literature distinguishes 
two groups of factors: push factors, which relate to economic and financial conditions 
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outside the receiving country, such as global interest rates or the growth of world GDP, 
and pull factors, which include economic and financial conditions in the receiving 
country. The study of those factors is relevant for policymakers, both in AE and NAE, 
that face challenges related with the impact of capital flows on the stability of the 
financial system and domestic economy. These studies can be useful for the 
implementation of macroeconomic prudential reforms.  
There is no general agreement on whether capital flows are mainly driven by push 
factors or by pull factors. As stated by Alfaro et al. (2007), the fact that there is no 
consensus about this issue is due to differences on the sample, different time periods, 
and differences regarding the forms of capital flows studied. In the early 1990s, 
evidence suggested that the push factors supplanted pull factors (IMF, 2011a). Since the 
early 2000s, the literature has been focusing on the influence of pull factors on 
determining capital flows. The main conclusion is that both push and pull factors matter 
in driving capital flows (Montiel, 2014). 
Chuhan, Claessens, & Mamingi (1998) study whether the capital flows to Asian and 
Latin American economies from 1988 until 1992 were driven by push factors or by pull 
factors. They conclude that both drivers are important in order to explain the flows. 
However, its importance varies across regions and components. Global factors are, 
indeed, more important to explain capital flows to Latin American economies while, on 
the contrary, country-specific factors are much important in explaining capital flows to 
Asian economies. 
Fostel & Kaminsky (2008) examined which factors were relevant in explaining 
Latin American economies’ access to international financial markets between 1980 and 
2005. Their work focuses on gross issuance of bonds, equity, and syndicated loans and 
its goal is to understand if the access to international financial markets is mainly driven 
by domestic factors - good behavior - or external factors - global liquidity. Overall, the 
external factors explain the access of Latin American economies to a higher degree than 
domestic factors do. Apparently, “the boom-bust pattern in international issuance has 
been mainly driven by fluctuations in global liquidity and investors’ changing risk 
behavior” (Fostel & Kaminsky, 2008). 
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In addition, Förster, Jorra, & Tillmann (2014) examine the degree of co-movement 
of gross capital inflows using a dynamic hierarchical factor model to decompose gross 
capital inflows into global factors, factors specific to a particular type of capital inflows, 
regional factors, and country-specific factors. Overall, the latter set of factors is the one 
that contributes the most to explain the driving forces behind capital flows, accounting 
for 60% to 80% of the dynamics. Furthermore, the results allow the authors to conclude 
that regional factors explain about 5% to 20% of capital flow’s fluctuations. Finally, the 
authors conclude that global factors only explain a residual portion of the overall 
variation. 
Besides the distinction of the influence of push and pull factors, the literature has 
been focusing on the importance of individual variables in explaining capital flows. 
The size of the economy, whether measured by GDP per capita or total GDP, is 
usually used as a determinant of capital flows in order to test the hypothesis that bigger 
economies attract higher levels of capital flows. This effect is found to significantly and 
positively affect capital flows: Faria & Mauro (2009) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & 
Volosovych (2008) for instance confirm this effect. However, other studies, as Alfaro et 
al. (2007), found no evidence of this effect.  When the literature switches its attention to 
the GDP growth, whether per capita or not, in order to capture the difference in growth 
prospects and possible cyclical differences between GDP growth of the domestic 
economy and that of a foreign economy, or a group of economies, the results are even 
more unequivocal in confirming the positive correlation between GDP growth and 
capital flows – Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2011), Mercado & Park (2011), Cerutti et al. 
(2014), and Förster et al. (2014) support this hypothesis. 
Among the broad array of factors that the literature pines down as explaining capital 
flows is the interest rate differential between the domestic and the foreign economy, 
usually the USA, or an aggregate of economies  (e.g. see Mercado & Park, 2011 for the 
former and Nier et al., 2014 for the latter). This variable’s objective is to capture the 
Mundell-Fleming’s capital mobility effect due to differences in interest rates (Mark, 
2000). Taylor & Sarno (1997) argue that falls of interest rates in the United States 
encouraged investors to shift their investment decisions to Latin America and Asian 
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economies in pursuit of high-yield investments during the period 1988-1992. 
Accounting for portfolio flows, the authors find that a rise in external interest rates 
influences both short-term equity and debt portfolio inflows. Additionally, Nier et al. 
(2014) found a significant positive effect of the short-term interest rate differential on 
gross inflows excluding FDI as a share of GDP, when controlling for a series of other 
variables. When controlling for fewer variables, the differential is not significant. 
However, Mercado & Park (2011) found no evidence that total inflows were 
significantly affected, either for emerging economies or for developing Asian 
economies, during the period 1980-2009. This conclusion holds even when looking at 
subcomponents of the financial account, such as FDI, portfolio investment, or other 
investment. Carlson & Hernandéz (2002) find evidence of the same effect regarding the 
largest recipients of capital flows during the 1990s: capital inflows received by these 
economies were not affected by the interest rate differential. Again, this result holds 
even when studying the subcomponents of the financial account. Finally, Cerutti et al. 
(2014) concluded that the interest rate differentials are not significant in explaining 
cross-border bank flows during 1990-2012. 
Theoretically, the literature argues that trade openness to be positively related with 
capital flows, as international trade may imply the transaction of financial instruments 
in order to finance the trade flow or hedge any type of risk, such as foreign exchange 
risk or interest rate. Additionally, Martin & Rey (2006) argue that trade openness 
increases the resilience to financial crises: countries with a higher degree of 
international trade have profits and dividends that are less dependent on local income. 
Given so, an exogenous reduction in the national income will have a lower impact on 
the price of financial assets and capital flows because trade openness will counteract the 
initial effect. Cavallo & Frankel (2008) find that trade openness make economies less 
vulnerable to sudden stops and currency crashes arguing that higher ratios of trade in % 
of GDP decreases the required adjustment when international financing is cut-off. 
In the theoretical model of Heckscher-Ohlin with two countries with identical 
technologies, differing factors endowments and free trade in goods, but not factors, 
trade and capital flows are perfect substitutes: factor prices are equalized in the two 
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economies after trade (Feenstra, 2003). The fact that trade openness is a perfect 
substitute for capital flows would result in a negative relation between the two variables 
(Antràs & Caballero, 2009). Additionally, Mundell (1957) treats the substitutability 
between trade and capital differently: in a world with two economies, both with a 
homogeneous production function, with only two possible products that can be 
produced with each of the products requiring a greater portion of one factor than the 
other commodity at any factor prices and with no possible specialization due to factor 
endowments, impediments imposed to trade increase factor movements and 
impediments imposed to factors increase trade movements. Finally, there is a vast 
literature that assesses the importance of trade linkage as a mechanism of propagation of 
financial crises. Forbes & Warnock (2012) assess the importance of the trade channel 
on identifying episodes of surges, stops, flights and retrenchment of capital flows 
concluding for an important role of trade linkage explaining crises contagion. While 
Faria & Mauro (2009) and Fostel & Kaminsky (2008) have found a positive relation 
between trade openness and capital flows, several studies rejected that relation between 
trade openness and capital – see, e.g., Mercado & Park (2011), Okada (2013), Alfaro et 
al. (2007) and Förster et al. (2014). 
Another well-explored idea is the hypothesis that human capital affects capital 
flows. This hypothesis was first introduced in order to try to explain the Luca’s 
Paradox: why does capital not flow from rich to poor countries as the neoclassic theory 
predicts? Lucas (1990) argues the paradox can be partly eliminated by considering 
differences in human capital, as the incorporation of this factor in the neoclassic model 
decreases significantly differences in rates of return between rich and poor economies. 
However, differences subsist large enough to become a paradox as the incorporation of 
human capital does not explain completely why capital does not flow to countries with 
higher rates of return. Alfaro et al. (2007) find evidence that human capital is highly 
significant in explaining equity and debt inflows per capita – as significant as GDP or 
institutional quality. Faria & Mauro (2009) confirm the effect of human capital on 
equity components of capital flows and give new insights regarding the effect: the level 
of human capital affects the composition of capital flows. Countries with higher levels 
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of human capital tend to present external liabilities structures with higher shares of 
equity flows. Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee (1998), studying possible relations 
between FDI and output growth, placed special attention in the role of human capital. It 
was found that the FDI’s effect on GDP growth is dependent on the level of human 
capital – the higher the level of human capital, measured by the level of educational 
attainment, the higher the contribution of FDI to economic growth. The authors 
conclude human capital enhances the efficiency of FDI on promoting GDP growth. 
Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001) study the hypothesis that educational policies 
with the objective of raising the level of human capital might enhance the country’s FDI 
attractiveness. The authors, following Lall (1998), conclude that countries which rely on 
low-cost human capital are less able to attract high added-value FDI, slowing the 
potential effect of FDI on output growth. 
Similarly to corporate finance literature, there is a growing literature that relates the 
role of institutions with a country’s structure of external debt. Albuquerque (2003) 
models capital flows under a scenario where international financing contracts lack the 
proper mechanisms to enforce payment and inalienability of FDI. The former is argued 
to create financing constraints, proxied by increases in credit risk, and the latter implies 
that to expropriate FDI is not advantageous relatively to other capital flows. Faria & 
Mauro (2009) dedicated special attention to the role of institutions. Looking at total 
equity, portfolio equity, and FDI, the authors conclude institutional quality, measured 
by the Worldwide Governance Indicators index constructed by Kaufmann & Mastruzzi 
(2004), is significantly and positively associated with total equity, portfolio equity and 
FDI. The results support the idea that the higher is the institutional quality the more the 
capital structure of a country tends to move in favor of FDI over debt: in other words, 
the higher the institutional quality of a country the higher is the share of FDI on the 
attracted flows and the fewer is the portion of debt. Alfaro et al. (2008) revisit Luca’s 
paradox and raise the possibility that institutions, through the protection of private 
property and by preventing the blocking of the adoption of new technologies, affect 
productivity and market returns and consequently the economic growth and capital 
flows. These results are in line with those obtained by Papaioannou (2009) regarding 
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the influence of institutional quality in explaining the Luca’s paradox: institutions can 
explain part of Lucas’ paradox. Even if individualy it is not found to be significant, 
Okada (2013) found that institutional quality has expressive interaction effects with 
financial openness: the effect of institutions on capital flows increases with financial 
openness. 
Besides institutional quality, the growth of monetary aggregates was also used on 
models that assessed the determinants of capital flows, as a proxy of global liquidity. 
The hypothesis the literature tests is based on the possible positive effects of increases 
of global liquidity on capital flows. Mercado & Park (2014), using the growth of broad 
money (M2) weighted for the GDP of the 20 largest economies, reject this hypothesis 
for the case of total inflows to emerging economies from 1980 to 2009. Additionally, 
Cerutti et al. (2014) find evidence of a positive and significant relation between the 
growth of money aggregates in the G4 economies (Euro Area, Japan, US, and UK) and 
bank flows to AE and NAE. Rodrik & Verdasco (1999) assessing which factors 
contribute to explaining the maturity structure of debt found M2 in % of GDP to have a 
consistent and robust effect over the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. However, 
Lim, Mohapatra, & Stocker (2014) proxy the global liquidity by the level of the U.S. 
M2 finding that this effect on gross inflows to developing countries is indistinguishable 
from zero. Regarding FDI inflows, foreign portfolio investment inflows, or even other 
investment inflows the hypothesis is also rejected by Mercado & Park (2014).  
Another well-established effect on capital flows is that of global risk aversion, 
usually proxied by the VIX.
11
 Theoretically, swings in investment sentiment – between 
risk-on and risk-off – are expected to influence the rebalancing of portfolios as increases 
in uncertainty and risk aversion tend to decrease the agents’ investment decisions 
(Powell, 2010). Fratzscher (2012) finds the VIX to be highly significant regarding net 
portfolio inflows for emerging economies, both before and after the 2008 crisis, and 
regarding bond portfolio flows, both for advanced and emerging economies. However, 
this relation does not hold for equity portfolio flows, for which the VIX is only found to 
be significant for AE. Ahmed & Zlate (2014) obtain results in line with those of 
                                                        
11
 The VIX measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. 
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Fratzscher (2012): they concluded that total portfolio flows was significantly affected 
by the VIX during the entire period of 2002-2012; while total net inflows are not found 
to be correlated with the VIX. Burns et al. (2014) and Lim et al. (2014) are also in line 
with these results: the VIX was found to be significant regarding portfolio and debt 
inflows. Additionally, those authors find that it was also correlated with gross financial 
inflows for the 2000-2013 period. Nier et al. (2014) made their contribution regarding 
this topic focusing particularly on the effect of the global financial cycle measured by 
the VIX on capital flows and the relation between the VIX and other macroeconomic 
variables. The results provide new insights about this subject, raising the possibility that 
the VIX affects capital flows non-linearly. When the VIX is low, fundamentals are the 
most important variables explaining the flow of capitals. Contrarily, the higher the VIX 
the higher its importance in explaining capital flows, supplanting fundamentals. Here, 
the interest rate differential is the exception. Additionally, the effect of the VIX on 
capital flows is positively related with the degree of capital mobility. Dividing the 
sample in a pre and post-crisis period, the results follow the hypothesis of the VIX’s 
nonlinearity. In fact, the VIX is larger on the post-crisis period which is consistent with 
the interaction model presented by the authors: the higher the VIX the higher its 
importance in explaining capital flows. 
Based on Ando & Modigliani (1963), De Santis & Lürhmann (2006) test the 
hypothesis that differences in country’s demographic structure drive capital flows since 
economies with younger and older demographic structures are characterized by having 
lower saving rates. Furthermore, those countries tend to have a higher investment 
demand, as shown by Higgins (1998). In financially integrated markets, countries’ 
demographic differences create an incentive to capital flow to younger and older 
economies if they offer a higher premium. The authors find that increases, in short and 
medium term, in youth-age and old-age in percentage of total population relative to the 
world average are positively associated with increases in net equity inflows; when 
focusing on net debt flows, this association does not hold, as demographic structure 
does not appear as significant. 
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Besides the usual attention the literature places on the volume of capital flows, there 
is an increasing trend in the literature with the objective to assess which factors explain 
the volatility of capital flows. Usually, studies on this field try to raise new insights 
regarding four distinct questions: i) Is there any difference on volatility depending on 
the type of economy considered, ii) Is volatility driven by global or local factors, iii) 
Among global and local factors, which is the most significant in explaining volatility 
and, finally, iv) Are the determinants of the volatility of capital flows the same among 
the components of the financial account? 
To begin with, the literature tends to accept the idea that capital flows are more 
volatile in emerging economies than in advanced ones. Broner & Rigobon (2004) show 
that the standard deviation of capital inflows to emerging economies is almost 80% 
higher than in AE. The authors argue that this happens due to the fact that capital flows 
to emerging economies are more subject to large negative shocks, that these shocks are 
characterized by a contagion effect, and finally that these shocks are more persistent 
than when they occur in AE. The conclusions of Levchenko & Mauro (2007) are in line 
with those of Broner & Rigobon (2004): the cross-country median of the standard 
deviation of the financial account is found to be 55% higher in emerging and 
developing countries in comparison with AE. However, there is some literature that 
contradicts these conclusions: for instance, Bluedorn, Duttagupta, Guajardo, & 
Topalova (2013) conclude that the volatility of both gross inflows and outflows is 
higher in AE, for the diverse components of the financial account. 
Regarding whether the volatility of capital flows is driven by global or local factors, 
Broto, Díaz-Cassou, & Erce (2008) find no evidence that FDI volatility is affected by 
global factors, contrary to domestic macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, 
reserves, and institutional development. However, push factors are robustly correlated 
with portfolio investments’ volatility: higher levels of world GDP as well as monetary 
easing conditions are positively associated with increasing levels of volatility. The 
authors argue the first effect may correspond to competition among agents for funds and 
the second effect may be consistent with the increase in speculative activities as global 
liquidity increases. Broto, Díaz-Cassou, & Erce (2011) concluded that during 2000-
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2006 global drivers were the prominent factors affecting emerging market capital flows’ 
volatility, reporting a homogenous increasing importance of these drivers in explaining 
capital flows’ volatility since the 2000s. Contrastingly, local factors are rejected to have 
similar effects on the different components of financial account, possibly affecting the 
components in opposite ways. This characteristic of capital flow’s volatility might 
increase the complexity of recommendations for economic policy: besides the possible 
distinct effects, local factors may only be significant regarding one component. In this 
case, policy recommendations could vary with the component’s volatility policymakers 
may desire to manage. 
Regarding which characteristics affect capital flows’ volatility, Mercado & Park 
(2011) study which factors explain how volatility varies across categories of capital 
flows – trade openness increases the volatility of all categories; at the same time, 
changes in stock market capital only affect portfolio inflows. In addition, the same 
factor might affect different categories distinctively: financial openness is found to 
affect FDI positively inflows and portfolio inflows negatively; this conclusion 
reinforces the conclusion of Broto, Díaz-Cassou, & Erce (2011). Economies with better 
institutions were found, by Neumann, Penl, & Tanku (2009) and Broner & Rigobon 
(2004), to be positively associated with a lower degree of volatility, having improved 
the ability to avoid adverse effects of larger capital flows due to capital liberalization. 
Additionally, Neumann et al. (2009) found that the effects of financial liberalization on 
the volatility of net capital flows are not clear: even though the findings reveal that the 
standard deviation of FDI and portfolio flows increase with liberalization, the 
significance of the coefficient does not hold regularly. The conclusions of Bogdanov 
(2014) are in line with those of Neumann et al. (2009) as the author finds that the 
estimated effects of capital account liberalization on net capital flows’ volatility is close 
to zero and not statistically significant, arguing that capital account policies do not have 
a considerable effect on cooling off the volatility of the financial account. Broto et al. 
(2011) conclude for a significant U-shape relation between economic development and 
FDI volatility. Additionally, the authors find a quadric relation between economic 
development and bank flows’ volatility. 
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Last, but not the least, FDI is generally found to be the most stable component of  
the financial account, as concluded by Alfaro  et al. (2007) and Mercado & Park (2011). 
Nevertheless, some argue that FDI is not as stable as the literature generally concludes 
(Brukoff & Rother, 2007). These authors argue that literature’s conclusions are biased 
by the way FDI data is compiled, being less accurate in capturing posterior capital 
transactions than in capturing the initial interaction between agents. Furthermore, FDI 
could mislead literature since data does not capture situations in which agents incur in 
financial engineering to bypassing capital controls or decreasing taxation significantly. 
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3.4 Did the global financial crisis cause a shift on the drivers of capital flows? 
Some authors explored the idea of a shift on the determinants of capital flows after 
the GFC. The motivation is to obtain an answer to the following question: did the global 
GFC cause a shift on the drivers of capital flows? 
Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2011) analyze, with different countries, the drivers of capital 
flows during the collapse phase (2008:Q4 – 2009:Q1) and the recovery stage (2009:Q2 
- 2009:Q4). The main goal was to determine the stylized facts and main drivers of the 
collapse in the international capital flows in the period following the GFC.  
Regarding the collapse stage, the results indicate that the reverse in capital inflows 
was more severe for countries with larger gross debt positions and larger net liabilities 
regarding debt instruments. The results also allow the authors to conclude that the 
collapse was more severe in countries that experienced a faster GDP prior to the GFC 
and with higher GDP per capita. When looking at the recovery stage, the authors find 
the results to be generally consistent with the pre-crisis period: countries with larger 
gross debt positions and slower growth in trading partners experienced slower increases 
on capital inflows. Overall, the retrenchment of capital flows can be linked to the 
international financial exposure and, to a lower degree, to macroeconomic variables, 
especially the performance of trading partners. Countries with higher degree of financial 
integration and with larger net liabilities positions regarding debt instruments suffered 
sharper declines in capital flows. With greater difficulty, the retrenchment can be linked 
to some pre-crisis macroeconomic conditions as pre-crisis GDP growth, GDP per 
capita, and growth of trading partners. 
Fratzscher (2012) studies the causes of the collapse of capital flows in 2008 and the 
subsequent surge, focusing on the importance of push and pull factors. The author 
focuses on whether there was a significant change on the determinants of capital flows 
from the pre to the post-crisis period. The object of study was the portfolio investment 
flow between October 2005 and November 2010. Countries’ external exposure before 
the GFC, namely through trade and finance, is found to have played a minor role in 
accounting for the transmission of global shocks. By contrast, fundamentals and 
institutions contributed to isolate financial markets from adverse and idiosyncratic 
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shocks during the GFC. One of the main findings of the paper is that global common 
factors are, during the sample, as important as country-specific factors in explaining net 
capital flows. Nonetheless, differences are found within region and period of time. 
Common factors are more important in explaining net capital flows during the crisis, 
while pull factors seem to be more important in the period after 2009.  
Finally, Ahmed & Zlate (2014) separately estimated their model for the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis period in order to assess if there was any change on the determinants of 
net inflows and portfolio inflows for the major emerging economies. For net capital 
inflows, the authors do not find many differences between the two distinct periods as 
the main determinants are the growth and policy rate differentials; on the contrary, risk 
aversion only has a significant negative effect in the post-crisis period. Regarding 
portfolio inflows, the growth differential is not significant in both periods, while the 
policy rate and the VIX are significant in both periods: the former is positively related 
with portfolio inflows while the latter is negatively associated. Considering structural 
break tests for these dependent variables, the authors conclude for a structural change in 
the sensitivity of flows to policy rate differentials, especially for portfolio inflows. 
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3.5 The effect of unconventional monetary policies on capital flows - empirical 
results  
Seven years after the GFC, the monetary tsunami continues to flood the world 
economy. Monetary accommodation remains critical to support the real economy and to 
encourage economic risk taking in AE, with the objective to increase real spending by 
households and to encourage businesses to invest and hire (IMF, 2014c). 
Even if UMPs successfully stimulated economy, “(…) market and liquidity risks 
have increased to levels that could compromise financial stability if left unaddressed.” 
(IMF, 2014c). This built up of risks can compromise financial stability and affect 
economic fundamentals. The available evidence seems to suggest that unconventional 
policies have increased the leverage of the corporate sector (IMF, 2014b). The effects of 
these actions on NAE could have been disguised by their fundamentals in the post-crisis 
period. In recent years, the cooling down of the fundamentals in NAE may have 
emerged the risks built up by the response of the major central banks of the AE. 
When the major central banks started to implement UMPs, the literature 
reconsidered its main purpose and began to assess whether UMPs accelerated or not 
capital flows to NAE; in the presence of a positive answer, literature questioned if those 
policies impacted equally the components of the financial account. As presented in the 
previous sections, literature supports the hypothesis that UMP decreased interest rates in 
AE. It was argued that the decrease of short and long-term interest rates in AE induced 
capital to flow to countries with higher returns (IMF, 2013d). Additionally, it was 
argued that UMP created an excess of global liquidity which, together with low interest 
rates in AE and better growth prospects in NAE, pulled capital to flow to NAE by 
increasing investors’ risk taking (IMF, 2014c). 
Fratzscher et al. (2013) analyzed the global spillovers of Fed’s UMP measures both 
in the US and other AE as well as in NAE. The objective of the study is to investigate 
the effects of the UMP measures on asset prices and on portfolio decisions, focusing on 
equity portfolio flows and on bond portfolio flows from January 2007 to December 
2010. Regarding the way UMP is captured, two measures are used: 
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1) Dummies to capture the effects of the announcements related to Q1 and Q2 
policies. As generally accepted in the literature regarding the announcements of the Fed, 
twelve episodes are taken into consideration. 
2) The specific market interventions by the Fed are measured by the weekly 
changes of the amounts of the following operations: liquidity support measures for the 
financial sector, purchases of long term Treasury bonds, and purchases of long term 
mortgage backed securities and government-sponsored enterprise agency debts. 
One of the major findings is that LSAP announcements had smaller effects on 
portfolio allocation than the effective implementation of the measures. Another finding 
is that US QE measures only explain a small portion of equity and bond portfolio flows 
between 2007 and 2010. However, UMP measures introduced an additional pro-cycle 
effect on portfolio flows to NAE. 
Ahmed & Zlate (2014) assessed the primary drivers of private capital flows to NAE. 
Additionally, the work also seeks to raise a contribution on whether there has been a 
significant change on the behavior of capital flows after the GFC, comparing with the 
prior period, and whether UMPs triggered capital flows into NAE. Their work focuses 
on total and portfolio flows using a sample of seven Asian economies and five Latin 
American economies with quarterly data from 2002 to 2012. To capture the effects of 
UMPs, the authors use several measures: firstly, they use a dummy variable to assess if 
the capital flows to emerging markets reacted to the announcements of monetary 
actions; secondly, the 10-year US Treasury bond yield is used; finally, the net asset 
purchases are used to more directly capture the effect of UMP. The authors conclude, 
from the estimations they made, that the dummy variable for the announcements is not 
statistically significant for total net inflows, but is positive and statistically significant 
for portfolio net inflows. Regarding the statistical significance, the same result is 
obtained for the 10-year US Treasury bond yield, with the difference that the effect on 
portfolio flows is negative. Finally, the measure of LSAP is found to negatively 
influence portfolio inflows, even though it is not significant regarding total net inflows. 
Contrarily to the previous studies, that focused on quantitative observed effects of 
monetary actions on capital flows, Lim et al. (2014) contributed to literature by 
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studying whether there are any additional unobserved effects of UMP after taking into 
account changes in the observable channels on gross capital inflows to developing 
countries since 2000Q1 until 2013Q2 with a sample of 60 emerging economies. The 
specification used on the paper does not include an explicit measure of quantitative 
easing due to the intention to capture UMPs’ unobservable effects. For instance, the 
authors test the hypothesis that unconventional monetary actions operated through an 
unobserved channel by using a dummy variable for each QE round. The results are as 
follows: the transmission of the UMPs occurs through liquidity, portfolio rebalancing, 
and confidence channels. Additionally, heterogeneous effects were found regarding the 
way the components of the financial account reacted to quantitative easing – captured 
by the dummy variable. The results support the idea that portfolio flows are the 
component that was most affected by those policies with FDI remaining largely 
insensitive to QE-related channels. 
Burns et al. (2014) followed the preceding work and studied the pattern of capital 
flows to NAE and the effects of UMP on those flows. The sample covers 60 developing 
countries from 2000:Q1 to 2013:Q2 and assesses the hypothesis that non-conventional 
monetary actions affected capital flows to emerging and developing economies through 
unobserved channels beyond the known monetary transmission mechanisms. Given so, 
quantitative measures of QE actions are not used. Instead, the authors use dummy 
variables to capture whether the extraordinary monetary measures have had an unusual 
effect on capital flows; these dummies are expected to capture the possibility that UMPs 
operated through unobservable channels. For robustness check, the authors present a 
continuous QE intervention measure based on the evolution of G4
12
 central banks’ 
balance sheet. 
The study concludes that both push and pull factors appear to be relevant to explain 
the flow of capitals to emerging markets in post-crisis period. Additionally, the increase 
in capital flows registered after the 2009 is explained by the accommodative monetary 
policies followed by the G4 central banks, suggesting that capital flows were higher 
than they would be given the levels of other variables. Notwithstanding, there is 
                                                        
12
 Fed, ECB, BoE and BoJ constitute the G4 group. 
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evidence that the impact on capital flows diminishes with the successive episodes of 
quantitative easing. 
Differently from the previous studies, Ree & Choi (2014) investigate how Korea’s 
capital flows reacted to UMPs. The focus on Korea is explained by the fact that Korea 
is in border line between AE and EME and capital flows to this economy may somehow 
follow a safe haven behavior: in risk aversion moments, agents may allocate their 
resources in Korea. The base model uses data from January 2008 until June 2013 and 
focuses on portfolio flows, both equity and bond, and banking flows. 
The authors conclude that portfolio equity flows to Korea are negatively related 
with the VIX. Contrarily, partially confirming the safe haven behavior, portfolio bond 
flows are positively related with VIX until risk aversion reaches a threshold. Once the 
threshold is breached, flows tend to react negatively to increases of risk aversion. 
Regarding the observable effect of UMP’s operations or monetary policy 
announcements, neither equity portfolio nor bond portfolios were found to have been 
significant directly affected by these variables. The only component affected by UMP 
was cross-border banking capital flows, essentially through the mortgage-backed 
securities purchase program. However, the authors present the idea that UMP actions 
influenced capital flows indirectly through a negative effect on the VIX and on global 
liquidity. 
Overall, literature tends to agree that UMP acted as an additional determinant of 
capital inflows to NAE. This conclusion holds for different specifications of the UMP, 
as well as for different measures of capital inflows. 
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3.6 Monetary policy normalization 
Understanding if UMPs pushed capital flows to certain economies will allow us to 
understand which are the economies that may be more vulnerable to the effects of the 
normalization of the monetary policy and the potential occurrence of sudden stops.
13
 
For instance, the reversal of UMP may prompt several problems in those economies 
with weaker fundamentals and external imbalances by increasing borrowing costs and 
making the financing of fiscal deficits more difficult (World Bank, 2012). One first 
event that could provide some indications as to what might happen when the 
normalization of monetary policy begins is the announcement, in May 2013, of the 
possibility of Fed’s intention to gradually reduce their large scale asset purchase 
program. 
In the final days of May 2013, Fed’s chairman Ben Bernanke raised the possibility 
of slowing down the pace of monthly acquisition of securities purchases from the 
prevailing $85 billion monthly rate to a lower quantity anticipating a complete phasing 
out (Bernanke, 2013). While this type of policies was not predicted by investors to last 
during a long period of time, the raise of the possibility of UMPs’ unwind surprised 
markets (Mishra, Moriyaman, N’Diaye, & Nguyen, 2014). The market reaction to the 
announcement was sharp and understood by literature as surprisingly large. However, 
the impact was heterogeneous among emerging economies (Eichengreen & Gupta, 
2014). Asset prices and currencies decreased, raising questions about NAE’s growth 
prospects in an environment of uncertainty (IMF, 2014e). 
This reaction to tapering talk was analyzed by the literature. The main objective was 
to understand which economies were affected and what drove capital flows in the period 
following the announcement, so a light could be raised towards understanding the 
possible effects of monetary policy normalization when the accommodative strategy 
was to be removed by monetary authorities. Eichengreen & Gupta (2014) analyze 
which countries were hit and why, focusing on the change in the exchange rate, foreign 
reserves and equity prices between April 2013 and August 2013. The authors conclude 
                                                        
13  For a detailed discussion on the transition from the unconventional monetary policy to a less 
accommodative monetary policy stance, one can see IMF (2014b), IMF (2014c), and IMF (2015). 
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there is no evidence that countries with stronger fundamentals experienced smaller falls 
in exchange rates, foreign reserves, and stock prices. The key factor was the size of 
financial markets: countries with deeper markets experienced larger adjustments. The 
possible explanation provided by the authors is that investors concentrated their actions 
in large and liquid financial markets where they could rebalance their portfolios, 
contrasting with small and illiquid markets where portfolio rebalancing was limited. 
Additionally, the authors found that countries that allowed the exchange rate to 
appreciate and that experienced greater current account deficits in the post-crisis period 
to experience the sharpest exchange rate depreciation, reserve losses, and stock market 
declines after the tapering talk. 
Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison (2014) assess a similar question of the previous 
work by focusing on the immediate impact of tapering talk on three asset prices: stock 
market, exchange rate, and CDS spreads. To do so, the authors use daily data from 
November 27, 2012, until October 3, 2013. The study is conducted for 26 emerging 
countries. When the estimation takes into account the full sample, Bernanke’s news are 
found to be associated with falls in stock prices and exchange rate depreciations, but 
show no significant impact on sovereign spreads, indicating the expectation of a 
retrenchment of capital flows and carry-trade to emerging markets. When the authors 
take into account the fundamental position of the different economies in the sample, 
dividing the sample between robust and fragile economies, the results reveal 
asymmetric adjustments: both groups experienced exchange rate depreciations by the 
time of Bernanke’s tapering announcements, with this depreciation being more than 
three times larger for the robust group comparing with the fragile group. Furthermore, 
the tapering talking increased substantially CDS spreads for countries with robust 
fundamentals while having negligible effects in countries with weaker fundamentals. 
Additionally, the stock price reacted negatively to the announcements. However, even 
though the sign is equal for both groups, the reduction is more than two times larger for 
the countries belonging to the robust group. 
To sum up, the results of Aizenman et al. (2014) imply that Bernanke’s 
announcement hit the group of economies with stronger fundamentals more severely. 
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The authors provide a possible explanation for the results: countries with stronger 
economies may be the ones that received higher capital flows in the earlier period of 
quantitative easing, which, in times of retrenchment of those flows, could imply that 
they these are the ones experiencing higher adjustments. 
However, there is some literature that provides empirical results that point in the 
opposite direction the previous works point. Mishra et al. (2014) analyze the market 
reaction around the dates of FOMC announcements from January, 1, 2013, to January, 
22, 2014 and explore the factors that might have influenced those reactions. The model 
presented controls for macroeconomic fundamentals, such as the current account 
balance, the fiscal balance, inflation, financial depth, trade linkages with China, capital 
flows measures, and macro prudential policies.  
The results are challenging in the sense they oppose the findings of Eichengreen & 
Gupta (2014) and Aizenman et al. (2014): market pressures are found to be reduced 
impact on countries with stronger fundamentals, deeper financial markets, better growth 
prospects, and a greater degree of financial integration. Countries with stronger 
fundamentals experienced lower pressure around each negative event.  
Additionally, IMF (2014e), in line with the findings of Mishra et al. (2014), also 
found evidence that countries with stronger fundamentals and deeper financial markets 
subdued market pressures during the period between May and August 2013. In 
particular, current account and fiscal surpluses, lower inflation, higher GDP growth, and 
more reserves were associated with lower exchange rate depreciation, reductions in 
asset prices, and lower increases in bond yields. 
Ahmed, Coulibaly, & Zlate (2015) assess “the importance of economic 
fundamentals in the transmission of international shocks to financial markets in various 
emerging markets (…)” particularly during the period of tapering talk. Consistent with 
the findings of Mishra et al. (2014) and IMF (2014e), they found emerging economies 
with better fundamentals to experience a smoother deterioration in exchange rates and 
increases in bond yields.  
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3.7 How should capital flows be measured? 
During the 1990s net capital inflows mirrored gross capital inflows very closely. For 
this reason, gross capital flows could, generally, be ignored in earlier studies (Forbes & 
Warnock, 2011). As the size and volatility of gross capital flows expanded, the relation 
between net capital inflows and gross capital flows began to be disturbed because net 
capital flows remained somehow stable (Forbes & Warnock, 2011). 
When deciding which of them should be the object of study, the question under 
investigation should be kept in mind. Net capital flows are the counterpart of the current 
account. If the economy is absorbing excessive net inflows, that might be an indicator 
of persistent current account deficits (De Gregorio, 2013). It could be said that that 
current account is what matters when focusing on the exchange rate, in particular real 
exchange rate. If the question under scrutiny is related with financial stability and the 
way EME’s financial system are able to manage flows, gross capital flows are the ones 
which must be taken into account (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014). 
Beyond the most used measures of capital flows, Janus & Riera-Crichton (2013) and 
Janus & Riera-Crichton (2014) proposed a four-way decomposition in order to answer 
to the fact that a considerable percentage of Balance of Payments changes on assets 
(liabilities) are actually negative (positive). The starting point for the decomposition is 
the balance of payments identity: 
 
Net Capital Inflow = Gross Capital Inflow − Gross Capital outflow ⇔ 
⇔ Net Capital Inflow = ∆Stock of Liabilities − ∆Stock of Assets 
 
As emphasised by Janus & Riera-Crichton (2013), both the variation of the stock of 
liabilities and of the stock of assets could actually register positive and negative values. 
This way, it is possible to re-write the equation: 
 
Net Capital Inflow = ∆Stock of Liabilities − ∆Stock of Assets ⇔ 
 ⇔ Net Capital Inflow = (L+ − L−) − (A+ − A−) 
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𝐿+  represents positive liability changes resulting from foreign investment in the 
economy; 
𝐿− represents the absolute value of negative liability changes resulting from foreign 
disinvestment in the economy, i.e., an outflow from the economy; 
𝐴+ represents positive asset changes resulting from domestic investment in foreign 
economies; 
𝐴−  represents the absolute value of negative asset resulting from domestic 
disinvestment in foreign economies, i.e., an inflow to the economy; 
The objective of this decomposition is to distinguish the investment and 
disinvestment components that gross capital inflow and gross capital outflow fail to. 
Exemplifying, consider a hypothetical scenario where the stock of assets due to FDI 
decreased by $1000. At the same time, portfolio investment on foreign economies 
increased by $500 and other investment assets increased as well by $500. Traditionally, 
the standard decomposition of capital outflows would record ∆𝐴 = 0 . However, 
following the four-way decomposition, we should record ∆𝐴+ = 1000  and  ∆𝐴− =
1000. 
Regarding the effectiveness of the four-way decomposition, Janus & Riera-Crichton 
(2013) concluded that it is possible to improve the prediction of sudden stop crises if 
literature would change its focus from the two way decomposition to the four-way one.  
Additionally, Janus & Riera-Crichton (2014), based on the previous decomposition, 
focus on capital reversals and its effects on output. The authors’ findings suggest that 
gross foreign investment reversals have a negative output effect allowing them to 
conclude “(…) that the composition of the current account and not just its level or rate 
of change, can have a first-order output effect.”. The authors also argue that these 
results could change the understanding of the literature regarding capital controls, as the 
more adverse output effect of reversals on the disinvestment component of liabilities, 
𝐿− , during financial crisis comparing with domestic outflows, via 𝐴+ , should push 
capital controls to limit the former but not the latter. Additionally, if the repatriation of 
capital, 𝐴−, is found to have stronger effects on the output than foreign inflows, 𝐿+, as 
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national investors tend to be better informed than foreign investors policymakers could 
have incentive to stimulate the former but not the latter. 
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4. Modeling capital flows 
4.1   Common determinants of capital flows 
We model capital flows following the literature reviewed on the previous chapter, as 
our purpose is not to present a new model to assess the determinants of capital flows. 
Contrariwise, our objective is to raise an econometric model that follows the general 
trend in the literature regarding the drivers of capital flows so we are able to analyze the 
questions we proposed to regarding the determinants of capital flows and whether there 
was a change on the determinants of the capital flows from the pre to the post-crisis. On 
the basis of that model, we will extend the benchmark model and introduce the UMP 
variables and the four-way decomposition. 
Regarding the global conditions, it is usual to include a GDP growth differential 
between the domestic economy and the US (see e.g. Burns et al., 2014) or, an aggregate 
of AE, such as the G4 (see e.g. Ahmed & Zlate (2014) and Nier et al., 2014). When a 
group of economies is considered, it is widely accepted to weigh the growth rates by 
GDP.  
In order to capture Mundel-Flemings’ capital mobility effect due to differences in 
interest rates, the interest rate differential is used in the literature, in which, apart from 
the country, or group of countries, with which the differential is built, different 
possibilities regarding the maturity of the interest rate used should be taken into 
consideration. Even though the literature usually focuses on U.S. monetary policies and 
consequently on US interest rates as proxy of global interest rates (Ahmed & Zlate, 
2014) it is possible to compute an aggregate interest rate (Nier et al. , 2014).  
Additionally, the literature considers measures of global risk aversion (see e.g. 
Ahmed & Zlate, 2014, and Nier et al., 2014), inflation, as in Fostel & Kaminsky (2008), 
and global money supply – Cerutti et al. (2014) and Burns et al. (2014). While not 
recurrent, there is also some literature which takes in account the yield curve of a 
country, or a group of countries, and the global growth expectation, measured by the 
Purchasing Managers' Index. 
It seems to be generally accepted to include trade openness as an explanatory 
variable, as argued by Montiel (2014) and exemplified by Mercado & Park (2011) and 
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Okada (2013). Measures of institutional quality are also common, differing on the index 
used – usually the choice lays in the index constructed by Kaufman & Mastruzzi (2004) 
and used by Mercado & Park (2011) and Faria & Mauro (2009).
14
  
As described in chapter 2, the study of how monetary actions in the post-crisis 
affected capital flows depends on what effect the researcher wants to capture. The 
literature provides three different options:  
i) Capturing qualitative effects of specific events through the use of dummy 
variables. We can distinguish two different options: the use of dummy variables in order 
to capture the effect of monetary announcements (see e.g. Ahmed & Zlate (2014) or 
Fratzscher et al. (2013)) or the effective implementation of those announcements (e.g. 
Burns et al. (2014) or Lim et al. (2014));  
ii) Controlling for the well-accepted channels by which monetary policy works 
literature presents the possibility of using a dummy variable to test the hypothesis UMP 
affected capital flows through unobserved channels beyond the usual transmission 
mechanisms (see e.g. Burns et al. (2014) or Lim et al. (2014)); and  
iii) Assessing the quantitative effects of UMP on capital flows whether of a specific 
policy, such as the net asset purchases by the Federal Reserve (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014), 
the weekly changes of liquidity support measures or the purchases of long-term assets 
by the Federal Reserve (Fratzscher et al., 2013), or a more broader quantitative 
measure, as the continuous expansion in the size of the central banks' balance sheet 
(Burns et al., 2014), which reflects the direction and the intensity of the monetary 
policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14
 There are, however, other possible choices as the Freedom House (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001),  the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), as proved by Papaioannou (2009), Alfaro et al. (2007), and 
Alfaro et al. (2008), or the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) which was used by 
Globerman & Shapiro (2002). 
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4.2   Baseline model and methodological considerations 
We use a panel data with the following specification:  
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 represents the capital flows to country i in the quarter t – whether on its net, 
gross or four-way form- expressed as a percentage of GDP. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the set of time variant 
and cross-country variables, 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  represents the only time-variant variable that is 
common to all the economies, and 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑡  represents the variables that try to capture 
unconventional monetary measures. 𝛼, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated, 
𝜇𝑖  represents the unobservable country-specific effect, and 𝜈𝑖𝑡  is the error term. We 
estimate the model including seasonal dummies. A more extensive analysis of this 
specification will be conducted in the following paragraphs.
15
 
In the literature, many paths were taken regarding model estimation. Before we opt 
for one, we will present the several options. Even if the literature on capital flows seems 
to generally agree on the use of panel data fixed effects in order to capture the 
unobserved heterogeneity among countries by takin into account all time-invariant 
country specific factors (e.g. see Fratzscher et al., 2013, Ahmed & Zlate, 2014, Burns et 
al., 2014, and Lim et al., 2014). Nier et al. (2014) discuss the pertinence of using 
random effects as produces proper estimates regarding variables that do not vary 
significantly through time and differences are due mainly from cross-country 
differences. Ahmed & Zlate (2014) argue that fixed effects could be properly employed 
when the previous differences are constant over time but differ from country to country 
as this model is adequate to capture long-term factors.  
Besides the discussion between fixed and random effects, which constitute the most 
common choices, other articles present distinct choices: i) Förster et al. (2014) use a 
dynamic hierarchical factor model as their objective is to estimate the pyramid structure 
that affects capital flows; ii) Fratzscher (2012) use a factor model; finally iii) Carlson & 
                                                        
15
 A brief description of each variable and where the data was retrieved from is provided in table A1 on 
the annex. 
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Hernandéz (2002) employ a seemingly unrelated regression technique, and iv) Ree & 
Choi (2014) estimate the panel data model by pooled OLS. 
We carry out the Hausman test for the benchmark model regarding NAE and AE in 
order to test which would be the most appropriate model to employ between fixed and 
random effects.   
 
Table 1 – Hausman test for non-advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Sample: Non advanced economies Non advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (1) (2) 
   
Chi-Sq. Statistic 23.7795 38.4529 
Prob. 0.0002 0.0000 
   
Note: Dependent variable in % of GDP. 
 
Table 2 – Hausman test for advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (3) (4) 
   
Chi-Sq. Statistic 10.7243 12.4566 
Prob. 0.0571 0.0290 
   
Note: Dependent variable in % of GDP. 
 
The results support the rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e., the use of fixed effects 
over random effects. This is also the most common choice in the literature as pointed 
anteriorly. Consequently, we will test our model using cross-section fixed effects. 
Nonetheless, we will, on section 5.6, discuss how the results would change if we would 
have opted for random effects. 
  
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 represent the different measures of capital inflows: 
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 Capital flows 
Net capital flows are defined as the difference between gross capital flows – the 
variation of the stock of liabilities registered in a certain period - and gross capital 
outflows – the variation of the stock of assets registered in a certain period. These 
variables are well-known and attract the majority of the attention from literature. 
Additionally, we will use the four-way decomposition in order to measure capital flows 
as discussed in section 3.7. 
All of these capital flows are measured relative to the GDP in US dollars. Because 
GDP is only available seasonally adjusted for 17 economies, the majority of the 
advanced ones, we should take in consideration possible seasonal effects. This is the 
reason why we include seasonal dummies in order to account for this effect. 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑍𝑡 represent the set of determinants likely to influence capital flows: 
 
 Growth differential 
This variable intends to capture the difference in growth prospects and possible 
cyclical differences between the real GDP growth in the i economy and the weighted 
average of the G4 economies: United States, Euro Area, Japan and United Kingdom. 
Similarly to the nominal GDP used to calculate the dependent variable, only the AE 
have seasonally adjusted data. Given so, we will avoid possible seasonal effects by 
calculating the real GDP growth over the homologous period.  
 
 Interest rate differential 
The interest rate differential aims to capture the possible effect regarding the 
difference of returns in agents’ decisions of rebalance their portfolios. For instance, 
when central banks from AE ease their monetary policies it is expected that their 
interest rates decline and that induces agents to rebalance their portfolio favoring assets 
with higher returns giving the same level of risk. 
From this point of view, we should use a measure that proxies, given countries’ 
differences regarding the financial system, a short-term indicator of investors’ 
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possibility of investment and it is homogeneous across all the countries in the sample. 
This is the usual option in the literature, as exemplified by Fratzscher (2012), Nier et al. 
(2014), and Burns et al. (2014). Given these aspects we use a 3-month money market 
interest rate that represents banks’ marginal cost of funding (Coeuré, 2012). We build 
the G4 variable weighting the average of the G4’s interest rates with GDP. 
 
 VIX 
In line with the existing literature, the VIX is used as a measure of global risk 
aversion.
16
 Theoretically, agent’s decisions are influenced by swings in investment 
sentiment. In periods of higher risk aversion agents tend to rebalance their portfolios 
towards safer and more liquid assets (Jevčák, Setzer & Suardi, 2010); the VIX measures 
the implied volatility of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index options. We will 
follow Nier et al. (2014) and compute the log of the VIX. 
 
 Trade Openness 
The variable is constructed summing the imports and the exports of a country and 
dividing it by the GDP in US dollars. This variable follows Alfaro et al. (2008), 
Mercado & Park (2011), and Okada (2013). 
 
 Institutional Quality 
We proxy institutional quality using the index constructed by Kauffman et al. 
(2004), such as Faria & Mauro (2009) did. This index reflects six dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  
 
UMPs are intended to be captured by variables included in 𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑡: 
 
 
                                                        
16 There are, however, other alternatives as the Credit Suisse’s Global Risk Appetite Index (Ahmed & 
Zlate, 2014), the VXD and the VXN (Abutaleb & Hamad, 2012 and Wong & Fong, 2013). 
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 Announcements from monetary authorities: 
As Fratzscher (2013) and Ahmed & Zlate (2014), we also intend to capture the 
possible effect of announcements of UMPs on capital flows. Because our study includes 
more than one central bank, contrarily to the previous works, we will follow Lim et al. 
(2014) and Burns et al. (2014) and their episode indicator in the sense that we will 
define the dummy variable as taking the value of one if there are two or more monetary 
announcements from the G4 central banks in the quarter and zero if that does not occur. 
We should note however that the episode indicator from Lim et al. (2014) and Burns et 
al. (2014) is related with the effective implementation of QE policies rather than its 
announcement, as it is our intention. 
Our announcements follow the work of Fawley & Neely (2013) that we expand 
beyond 2012.
17
 To do so, we followed authors’ rational and categorized monetary 
authorities’ announcements as related with UMPs if the action increased the central 
bank liabilities. To do so, we reviewed the monetary policy announcements of each of 
the four central banks. 
 
 Balance sheet expansion: 
As argued in section 3.2, we will quantitatively measure the different monetary 
policies by the expansion of the balance sheet of the G4 central banks. Based on Burns 
et al. (2014) and Lim et al. (2014) we will construct our variable by weighting the 
quarterly balance sheet variation of G4 central banks by the GDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17
 The list of announcements could be consulted in table A2 to A5. 
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4.3   Data 
We use quarterly data on direct investment, portfolio investment and other 
investment from January of 2005 to December of 2014, available in the IMF’s database 
Balance of Payment Statistics, for 54 economies.
18
 This period correspond to the full 
period available regarding the most recent Balance of Payments Manual, the 6
th
. From 
the same database we obtain nominal GDP. International Financial Statistics, on its 
turn, provides us data of real GDP, exchange rates, and import and export of goods and 
services. Additionally, the VIX was obtained from the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE). The measure of institutional quality was obtained from the World 
Governance Indicators’ database which is produced by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay 
and Massimo Mastruzzi. Finally, data regarding central banks’ balance sheet is 
collected from each of the central banks’ databases. 
Regarding the sample of countries and given that our aim is to study the 
determinants of capital flows both to AE and NAE, we will follow Fratzscher et al. 
(2013).
19
 For instance, regarding emerging economies the sample contains the most 
representative countries for each region that has been focusing by policy-making 
literature – Latin America, Asia, Emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa - as 
discussed in chapter 2. Additionally, because Fratzscher et al. (2013) is the only study 
that assesses similar questions to ours using AE follow this sample as a benchmark 
allows us to incorporate AE.  
However, given data restriction regarding the explained variable it is not possible to 
follow completely the original sample. Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Taiwan and Venezuela are dropped off the sample because of data restriction. 
Additionally, statistical analysis was employed to identify the countries that consistently 
stood out from the other countries in a cross section way.
20
 Because the experience of 
                                                        
18
 The countries included in the sample are listed in table A6. 
19
 Studies about capital flows focus mainly on emerging and developing economies. There is, however, 
some literature that groups in the same sample AE and NAE as Choi, Sharma & Strömqvist, Reinhart & 
Reinhart (2008), Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2011), or Fratzscher (2012). Generally, when that is the option, 
the results are presented in the three ways: for all the economies, for the advanced, and for the non-
advanced economies. 
20
 An observation was considered an outlier if it outside the range determined by the average for quarter t 
plus (minus) three times the standard deviation of the observations in that quarter. 
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the countries regarding the behaviors of the variables may differ with the classification 
of the country between advanced and non-advanced group of economies, this statistical 
analysis was carried out taking that in consideration by employing the analysis after the 
sample was divided between AE and NAE. From this analysis Ireland, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore appear as outliers regarding the dependent variables.  
Regarding Ireland, there is not any work other than Fratzscher et al. (2013) that is 
close to ours and considers AE. Even though, we should note that Milesi-Ferretti & 
Tille (2011), on their study about the drivers of capital flows during the collapse phase 
(2008:Q4 – 2009:Q1) and the recovery stage (2009:Q2 - 2009:Q4), excluded Ireland as 
it registered extreme values given reflecting the country’s role as international financial 
intermediaries. This decision is in line with the results of our analysis. Consequently, 
we will remove the country from our sample.  Regarding the removal of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, Ahmed & Zlate (2014), Burns et al. (2014), and Lim et al. (2014) do not 
take those countries in consideration. Additionally, Milesi-Ferretti & Tille (2011) do not 
take them as well into consideration given its extreme values. These countries are part 
of the set of international financial centers, reason why their capital inflows are extreme 
comparing with the rest of the sample. This way, we will drop them from our sample. 
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5.   Estimation results 
5.1   Benchmark model 
Through the estimation of the benchmark model we intend to assess the 
determinants of capital flows during the period from 2005Q1 to 2014Q4. Additionally, 
these estimations allow us to evaluate the performance of the benchmark model in our 
sample by comparing the results with the literature.  Finally, the results will allow us to 
establish a base model from which we will extend to the UMP variables and to the four-
way decomposition. 
Table 3 presents us results for NAE. Both measures of capital flows are negatively 
related with the VIX, which confirms the hypothesis that agents tend to reduce their 
exposure to NAE in periods of higher risk aversion. Additionally, the growth of real 
GDP is positively related with both net and gross capital inflows, suggesting that agents 
tend to balance their portfolios towards NAE with higher growth. Moreover, trade 
openness is found to have a negative effect on capital flows which supports the 
hypothesis that external agents evaluate trade openness as a possible transmission 
channel of financial crises, decreasing the investment decisions to economies with 
higher degree of trade linkages (Förster et al., 2012).
21
 Finally, the result shows that 
institutional quality affects positively capital flows.  
These results are in line with those presented by Ahmed & Zlate (2014) and Burns 
et al. (2014) that conclude that generally both push and pull factors are important 
determinants of capital flows to emerging economies – the VIX, the growth differential 
and institutional quality seem to be the variables that are consistently significant in 
explaining capital inflows to NAE; contrarily, the interest rate differential is not 
significant regarding capital inflows 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
21
 For further discussion on how currency crises propagate through the trade channel see Glick & Rose 
(1999), Haile & Pozo (2008) and Haidar (2012) for example.  
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Table 3 - Benchmark results for non-advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non advanced economies Non advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (5) (6) 
VIX 
-0.0243 
(0.0076)*** 
-0.0591 
(0.0162)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6268 
(0.0882)*** 
0.9139 
(0.1281)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0048 
(0.0688) 
0.5621 
(0.4066) 
Trade openness 
-0.1599 
(0.0273)*** 
-0.1911 
(0.0459)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0743 
(0.0302)** 
0.1362 
(0.0488)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 867 867 
R-squared 0.337 0.286 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
At this point, we should try to understand how the results change if, as Fratzscher et 
al. (2013) did, we consider AE and NAE in the same sample. Following the results 
presented in table 4, for net capital inflows, only trade openness and institutional quality 
are significant with the same sign as previously discussed for NAE. Given the 
insignificance of both growth differential and the VIX comparing with the results 
previously presented for non-advanced results we are able to conclude that this is a 
signal that the model could fail to distinguish possible different experiences such as the 
advanced and non-advanced. Regarding gross capital flows the results are similar to the 
results presented in equation 6; the only difference lays on the insignificance of growth 
differential in equation 8 which was significant in equation 6. 
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Table 4 - Benchmark results for all the economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (7) (8) 
VIX 
0.0031 
(0.0060) 
-0.1108 
(0.0178)*** 
Growth differential 
0.0129 
(0.0749) 
0.2330 
(0.1756) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0729 
(0.0905) 
0.5271 
(0.3596) 
Trade openness 
-0.0953 
(0.0246)*** 
-0.2190 
(0.0578)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.1133 
(0.0244)*** 
0.2523 
(0.0638)*** 
Seasonal controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 1605 1605 
R-squared 0.298 0.151 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
In order to understand how putting together economies with possible different 
experiences may affect the results, we present in table 5 the results of net and gross 
capital flows when considering only AE. For net capital inflows, market sentiment is 
significant with positive coefficient, which constitutes a striking difference with the 
results previously presented, both for non-advanced and for all the economies in the 
same sample. This result may suggest that AE are perceived as safe-haven currencies.
22
 
In other words, when the risk aversion decreases, investors tend to flow their capital to 
NAE, which reflects the higher perceived riskiness of those economies (Bluedorn et al., 
2013). However, the coefficient of VIX changes when looking to gross inflows as it 
becomes negative. Bluedorn et al. (2013) argue that in periods of low risk aversion 
gross inflows increase less than gross outflows, suggesting that residents’ investing 
abroad is higher than foreigners’ investment inwards AE. 
                                                        
22  The literature usually emphasizes Switzerland and Japan as the countries to which this status is 
assigned the most. One could read Botman, Filho, and Lam (2013), Habib & Stracca (2013), or Ranaldo 
& Söderlind (2010) for further discussion on this subject. 
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Additionally, net inflows are positively related with interest rate differential, which 
confirms the hypothesis that economies with higher interest rates capture higher levels 
of net inflows. Trade openness registers a significant and negative coefficient, even 
when looking at gross inflows, which may confirm the hypothesis that agents perceive 
trade linkages as a channel of propagation of financial crises, decreasing the volume of 
capital to economies with higher trade openness. Finally, institutional quality has a 
positive coefficient regarding net and gross inflows. 
 
Table 5 - Benchmark results for advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows  Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (9) (10) 
VIX 
0.0298 
(0.0099)*** 
-0.1585 
(0.0321)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.0441 
(0.1690) 
1.1330 
(0.4650)** 
Interest rate differential 
0.6296 
(0.2798)* 
0.1395 
(0.8990) 
Trade openness 
-0.0346 
(0.0398) 
-0.2830 
(0.1658)* 
Institutional quality 
0.1005 
(0.0430)** 
0.2903 
(0.1498)* 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 719 719 
R-squared 0.305 0.166 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Overall, from the results we can see that including in the same sample AE and NAE 
in the same regression causes the model to produce results that are not consistent with 
the results of the different groups when estimated separately. This effect is noticeable 
significant when comparing NAE’s determinants of net capital inflows with the 
determinants of net capital inflows to all the economies. Moreover, we are able to 
conclude that VIX is a significant determinant of gross inflows both for NAE and AE. 
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Nonetheless, we should note that the VIX presented opposite signals regarding net 
inflows: the negative signal regarding NAE contrasts with the positive signal obtain for 
AE. Additionally, institutional quality was found to have a positive effect on capital 
inflows for the two groups, independently of the measure of the flows. Finally, growth 
differential is only relevant regarding inflows to NAE and gross inflows to AE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
59 
 
5.2   Did the determinants of capital flows change from the pre-crisis period to 
the post-crisis period? 
We will now study whether the determinants of capital flows in the pre-crisis period 
remained significant in the post-crisis period. By analyzing the pre and post-crisis 
periods separately we aim to identify potential differences regarding the determinants of 
capital flows in these two periods.
23
 This analysis follows the work of Fratzscher (2012) 
and Ahmed & Zlate (2014) that assessed a similar question. 
 Before doing so, we need to define the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods. We 
will follow the literature and define the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 as the episode that originated the GFC (e.g. Fawley & Neely, 2013). 
Therefore, we define the pre-crisis period from 2005Q1 until 2008Q3 and the post-crisis 
period from 2008Q4 until 20014Q4. 
For NAE there is not a significant difference between the two periods regarding net 
inflows, as both growth differential and institutional quality are significant with a 
positive coefficient.  As can be concluded from the results presented in equation 11 and 
12, the only difference is related with trade openness which is not significant in the pre-
crisis period but displays a statistically significant negative coefficient in the post-crisis 
period. The VIX, which was significant in the whole period, is not significant when the 
period is divided in the pre and post-crisis period.  These results differ, in part, from 
those of Ahmed & Zlate (2014) who conclude for a structural change from pre-crisis to 
post-crisis period especially regarding the sensitivity of capital flows to policy rate 
differentials. We should note, however, that Ahmed & Zlate (2014) raised their 
conclusions based structural break tests. In a different way, our work is based on the 
estimation of the two sub-periods separately.  
When we turn our attention to gross inflows we are able to conclude that there is no 
difference between the two periods: growth differential has a positive significant 
coefficient in the two distinct periods, while the interest rate differential is significant in 
                                                        
23
 The results regarding all the economies reveal the same problem that we discussed in the previous 
section. This way, even though we will not discuss the results, they may be consulted in tables A7 and 
A8. 
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the pre-crisis period but loses its significance in the post-crisis period. As in the case of 
net inflows, the VIX is not significant in each of the sub-periods. 
 
Table 6 - Pre and post-crisis regressions for non-advanced economies’ net inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non advanced economies Non advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q4 
Equation: (11) (12) 
VIX 
0.0152 
(0.0117) 
-0.0143 
(0.0109) 
Growth differential 
0.5333 
(0.1614)*** 
0.2253 
(0.1155)** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0066 
(0.0492) 
-0.1960 
(0.2764) 
Trade openness 
-0.1019 
(0.0654) 
-0.1097 
(0.0349)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.1458 
(0.0807)* 
0.1084 
(0.0548)** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 348 519 
R-squared 0.563 0.301 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
If we shift our attention from NAE to AE we can see on table 8 that, regarding net 
capital inflows, the experiences in the pre and post-crisis period were different: in the 
former period VIX was the only significant variable with a positive coefficient 
suggesting the same effect obtained to the whole period. When looking to the post-crisis 
the VIX results holds again – which could be an indication that during times of high risk 
aversion advanced economies were viewed as safe-haven by agents; additionally, trade 
openness and institutional quality were also significant in the post-crisis period, but not 
on the pre-crisis, with a negative and a positive coefficient, respectively. 
For gross inflows, the determinants do not differ when comparing the two sub-
periods: the VIX is significantly negative in both sets; the only difference lies on the 
negative significance of trade openness in the pots-crisis period. However, it should be 
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said that the results differ when we compare them with those obtained for the full period 
as growth differential and institutional quality lose their explanatory value. 
 
Table 7 – Pre and post-crisis regressions for non-advanced economies’ gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q4 
Equation: (13) (14) 
VIX 
-0.0006 
(0.0202) 
-0.0251 
(0.0185) 
Growth differential 
0.5395 
(0.3265)* 
0.2987 
(0.1619)* 
Interest rate differential 
0.6695 
(0.3255)** 
0.0701 
(0.5136) 
Trade openness 
0.0146 
(0.1047) 
-0.0519 
(0.0624) 
Institutional quality 
0.0205 
(0.0972) 
0.1382 
(0.1110) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 351 512 
R-squared 0.609 0.16 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
To sum up, our results differ from those of Ahmed & Zlate (2014) regarding NAE 
as we did not conclude for a change on the determinants of capital flows from one 
period to the other. In other words, the determinants of the capital flows in the pre-crisis 
period were generally found as the determinants of the capital flows in the post-crisis 
period. In addition, we also conclude for the inexistence of a change on the 
determinants of capital flows for the experience of AE’ gross inflows. AE’ net inflows 
appear as the only variable which registers a significant change on its determinants 
between the two periods. 
Finally, we should note that the when dividing the sample on the two periods, some 
results reveal less statistically significant variables that the equivalent equations on table 
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3 and 5. We suspect that this happens given the fewer number of observations taking 
into account by the model. 
 
Table 8 – Pre and post-crisis regressions for advanced economies’ net inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q4 
Equation: (15) (16) 
VIX 
0.0365 
(0.0139)*** 
0.0404 
(0.0150)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.2023 
(0.2788) 
-0.1497 
(0.2405) 
Interest rate differential 
0.2103 
(0.4448) 
-0.2946 
(0.7641) 
Trade openness 
-0.0140 
(0.0374) 
-0.1514 
(0.0730)** 
Institutional quality 
0.0144 
(0.0657) 
0.2934 
(0.0902)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 300 419 
R-squared 0.62 0.282 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 9 – Pre and post-crisis regressions for advanced economies’ gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q4 
Equation: (17) (18) 
VIX 
-0.0959 
(0.0569)* 
-0.0516 
(0.0288)* 
Growth differential 
0.8208 
(0.9932) 
0.0164 
(0.4119) 
Interest rate differential 
-1.1156 
(1.1838) 
0.5050 
(0.9970) 
Trade openness 
0.1315 
(0.1522) 
-0.0698 
(0.0331)** 
Institutional quality 
0.0452 
(0.2997) 
0.0303 
(0.0248) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 300 419 
R-squared 0.348 0.069 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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5.3   Did unconventional monetary policies push capital flows to certain 
economies? 
Until now we have analyzed the determinants of capital flows in the whole sample 
and in two distinctive sub-periods. We now introduce the variables aiming to capture 
the effects of UMP on capital flows. 
The results presented in tables 10 to 13 are robust across both dependent variables 
and across the different groups of economies considered: the increase in G4 central 
banks’ balance sheet is significant with the expected positive sign.  
 
Table 10 – UMP effects on net inflows to non-advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows  Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (19) (20) 
VIX 
-0.0208 
(0.0083)** 
-0.0165 
(0.0086)* 
Growth differential 
0.6153 
(0.0970)*** 
0.5801 
(0.0892)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0131 
(0.0744) 
0.0006 
(0.0685) 
Trade openness 
-0.1821 
(0.0304)*** 
-0.1558 
(0.0272)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0659 
(0.0312)** 
0.0780 
(0.0301)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
4.5273 
(1.5049)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0129 
(0.0049)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.344 0.342 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 11 – UMP effects on gross inflows to non-advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (21) (22) 
VIX 
-0.0479 
(0.0176)*** 
-0.0354 
(0.0170)** 
Growth differential 
0.8669 
(0.1404)*** 
0.8014 
(0.1330)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.6077 
(0.4090) 
0.5710 
(0.3899) 
Trade openness 
-0.2092 
(0.0515)*** 
-0.1828 
(0.0455)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.1917 
(0.0616)*** 
0.1443 
(0.0490)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
10.8288 
(2.7226)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0348 
(0.0090)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.297 0.299 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Focusing on the balance sheet variable, the results support the hypothesis that UMP 
pushed capital flows to NAE in the post-crisis period. This result is consistent for both 
net and gross inflows and points to the same direction of Fratzscher et al. (2013), 
Ahmed & Zlate (2014), Burns et al. (2014), and Lim et al. (2014). We should highlight 
that our result is important to literature as points in the direction of the previous studies 
using a different sample and a different measure of UMP. 
However, our results bring to the discussion another finding: UMP did not only 
affect non-advanced markets as it also affected gross inflows to AE. The closest result 
produced before by the literature is the one of Fratzscher et al. (2013) that supports the 
idea that FED’s liquidity operations induced equity portfolio inflows to AE as well the 
acquisition of mortgage-backed securities and government-sponsored enterprise debt 
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induced bond portfolio flows to the same economies. However, Fratzscher et al. (2013) 
conclude some UMP induced bond portfolios outflows from the AE, namely the 
acquisition of long term treasury bonds. This difference should take into consideration 
that our quantitative measure of UMP is broader since it includes four distinct central 
banks and, therefore, does not distinguishes individual countries’ policies. 
 
Table 12 – UMP effects on net inflows to advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (23) (24) 
VIX 
0.0326 
(0.0107)*** 
0.0331 
(0.0112)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.0179 
(0.1777) 
-0.0649 
(0.1702) 
Interest rate differential 
0.3100 
(0.2920) 
0.6248 
(0.2804)** 
Trade openness 
-0.0700 
(0.0537) 
-0.0338 
(0.0397) 
Institutional quality 
0.1068 
(0.0517)** 
0.0982 
(0.0437)** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
0.8586 
(1.8423) 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0048 
(0.0068) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 619 719 
R-squared 0.276 0.305 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Additionally, it should be noted in table 14 and 15 that when the sample includes 
both AE and NAE, the conclusions do not change. Fratzscher et al. (2013) find, 
however, that the change in the amount outstanding of long term Treasury bonds related 
to the long scale asset purchase affected equity and bond inflows negatively when 
considering AE and NAE at the same time.  
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Table 13 – UMP effects on gross inflows to advanced economies 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (25) (26) 
VIX 
-0.0787 
(0.0339)** 
-0.1078 
(0.0360)*** 
Growth differential 
0.8363 
(0.4932)* 
0.8145 
(0.4690)* 
Interest rate differential 
-0.2067 
(1.0167) 
0.0670 
(0.8815) 
Trade openness 
-0.1304 
(0.2157) 
-0.2715 
(0.1655) 
Institutional quality 
0.3270 
(0.1742)* 
0.2554 
(0.1505)* 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
28.3866 
(6.0245)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0727 
(0.0211)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.158 0.179 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The results of the announcement dummy variable point in the opposite direction 
as theory would suggest and are contrary to previous empirical studies: the coefficient is 
consistently significant with a negative sign which indicates that in quarters where at 
least two central banks announced a new monetary action that announcement induced a 
reduction in inflows across both to AE and NAE. These results do not support the 
hypothesis that UMP’s announcements itself contributed to increase capital flows to 
NAE economies as argued by Ahmed & Zlate (2014). Additionally, Fratzscher et al. 
(2012) finds a mixed effect of the announcements on capital flows, depending on the 
receiving economy and on the type of flow focused: QE1 announcements were found to 
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have affected positively equity and bond inflows to AE and NAE, except for bond 
inflows to NAE.
24
 
 
Table 14 – UMP effects on net inflows to all the economies 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (27) (28) 
VIX 
0.0074 
(0.0066) 
0.0142 
(0.0068)** 
Growth differential 
-0.0134 
(0.0763) 
-0.0495 
(0.0776) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.1074 
(0.1098) 
-0.0600 
(0.0865) 
Trade openness 
-0.1084 
(0.0284)*** 
-0.0913 
(0.0244)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.1156 
(0.0275)*** 
0.1134 
(0.0242)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
3.9189 
(1.2003)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0171 
(0.0044)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 1399 1605 
R-squared 0.286 0.305 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24
 We examine further this result by modifying the specification of the announcement variable from 
assuming 1 if at least two central banks announced a new monetary action to assuming 1 if the Federal 
Reserve announced a new policy. This way we were able to investigate if the difference on the results are 
related with the inclusion of the announcements of the ECB, BoE, and BoJ when comparing with 
previous studies. The results presented in table A9 to A11 do not differ significantly as the only alteration 
is related with the significance of the dummy when the dependent variable is the net inflow which is now 
not significant. Gross inflows continue to be negatively related with the dummy variable. 
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Table 15 – UMP effects on gross inflows to all the economies 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (29) (30) 
VIX 
-0.0642 
(0.0190)*** 
-0.0645 
(0.0199)*** 
Growth differential 
0.1140 
(0.1829) 
-0.0282 
(0.1855) 
Interest rate differential 
0.5434 
(0.3765) 
0.5811 
(0.3280)* 
Trade openness 
-0.1523 
(0.0666)** 
-0.2025 
(0.0569)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.3280 
(0.0772)*** 
0.2525 
(0.0627)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
20.1824 
(3.1487)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0715 
(0.0115)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 1399 1605 
R-squared 0.151 0.171 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
At this moment we should point that this variable’s results are not consistent either 
with what economic theory would guide us to expect or with the empirical results 
presented by the previous studies referred to. However, some points should be made 
clear regarding these results. Firstly, it needs to be said that these differences on the 
results could possibly be the result of the dummy capturing effects that are not related 
with the announcement. This problem could be related with two different situations: the 
use of an inadequate interval around the announcement or the inadequacy of 
quantitative variables in measuring effects of UMP in capital flows. 
Related with the first situation, Neely (2010) argues that event-based studies often 
use high frequency data to measure very short-term changes on the dependent variable 
after an announcement. In this way, the announcement would affect the variable if in a 
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short interval around the event the variance of the announcement shock is arbitrarily 
large compared with the variance of the shock to the variable under investigation 
(Rigobon & Sack, 2004). By using a short-term window around which the effects of the 
announcement are measured, such studies try to reduce the potential bias that rise from 
the announcing of other significant economic news during the period around which the 
event-study is carried out which potentially creates measurement error problems 
(Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). For instance, the event-study approach 
through the use of dummy variables during such a long period as a quarter may produce 
results that reflect more events beyond the one initially focused. Therefore, the 
interpretation of the results should be careful and reflect the potential bias that arises 
from the way that the announcement effect is being captured.  
Regarding the discussion of the suitability of using qualitative variables as a 
measure of UMP effects, it must be said that the use of quantitative variables which try 
to capture the effect of unconventional monetary policies produce more reliable results 
as they capture the effect of a variable that does not suffer from those possible bias. For 
this reason, in section 5.5 we test the effectiveness of the balance sheet variable by 
using an alternative measure. The conclusions do not change which enhances our 
preference of using quantitative variables over qualitative in assessing the effects of 
UMP measures. 
Given the limitations related with the use of qualitative variables discussed in the 
previous paragraphs, we will not use the dummy when considering the four-way 
decomposition as dependent variable as we recognize its limitations. We will, however, 
continue to use of the variable that captures the expansion of the balance sheet as we 
consider it the most adequate choice to capture the UMP effects on capital flows. 
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5.4   The four-way decomposition 
At this point, we will employ our benchmark model constructed on the base of the 
literature reviewed to the four-way decomposition perspective of capital flows.
25
  
Prior to describing our results we should note that from the four-way decomposition 
we will focus our attention on three components. On one hand, 𝐿+ and  𝐿− measure the 
variation of the stock of liabilities in a certain period. On the other hand, 𝐴+ and 𝐴− 
measure the variation of stock of assets. Recalling that our motivation in studying the 
recent experience of capital flows, and particularly the effect of UMP, is based on the 
possible macro-economic and financial stability effects that an overflow of capital flows 
could cause to the economies that receive them, we will focus on 𝐿+ and  𝐿−, as they 
account for the liability part of the balance of payments, as well as on 𝐴− which in its 
essence is a capital inflow – every time national agents decrease their holdings of 
external assets they are inducing capital inflows. 
We should highlight that we will focus only on NAE. This set of economies, after 
the GFC, account for 50% of the global capital inflows comparing with less than 20% in 
the six years before the event (IMF, 2014e). Together with significant growth and yield 
differentials (IMF, 2011b), UMP were argued to push capital inflows to NAE. As 
discussed in the previous section, our results support the hypothesis that UMP was 
significant in contributing for the increase of capital inflows received by the NAE 
relatively to total inflows. In many cases, “the inflows were accompanied by a rapid 
expansion of credit, fueling an overheating of domestic economies and setting the 
conditions for a buildup of vulnerabilities.” (IMF, 2014e). Because the experience of 
the NAE group in the post-crisis period was more likely to contribute to the build-up of 
internal and external imbalances, we will apply the four-way decomposition to this set 
of economies. 
On equation 31 and 34 we estimate the determinants of the investment decisions by 
foreign agents,  𝐿+ , in the whole sample regarding emerging markets. Growth 
differential is statistically significant with a positive coefficient, supporting the idea that 
foreign agents decide to invest on NAE with better growth prospects; on the contrary, it 
                                                        
25
 The results regarding advanced economies and all the economies are presented in table A12 to A15. 
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should be highlighted that risk aversion is not significant regarding those investment 
decisions. Additionally, we find UMP to act as an additional push factor of capital flows 
to NAE as the decisions of foreign agents in investing on those economies are positively 
related with the expansion of the G4 central banks’ balance sheet. This result could be 
relevant, considering the result of Janus & Riera-Crichton (2014) which concluded for 
an important effect of gross foreign investment reversal on the output, effect that is 
particularly strong for emerging countries during sudden stops crises. For instance, as 
discussed in section 3.6, events of normalization of monetary easing, namely by the 
Federal Reserve, might expose several problems to those economies with weaker 
fundamentals and external imbalances by increasing borrowing costs and making the 
financing of fiscal deficits more difficult (World Bank, 2012). On the second and third 
quarter of 2013, episodes of normalization of monetary policy triggered pronounced 
adjustments in emerging and developing countries namely affecting national stock 
markets, exchange rates, and CDS spreads decreasing the incentives to carry-trade 
activities on those economies and increasing uncertainty (Aizenman, Binici, & 
Hutchison, 2014). The result could be possible external shocks in form of sudden stops 
(IMF, 2010a, IMF, 2011b and Powell, 2010) or the retrenchment of capital outflows 
(Aizenman, Binici, & Hutchison, 2014). If the external shock operates through the 
reversal of foreign investment, the effect on the output can be harmful, particularly 
during currency, current account and sudden stop crises as argued by Janus & Riera-
Crichton (2014). 
Continuing with the second element of capital inflows, 𝐿−, equation 32 and 35 allow 
us to see that the VIX is significant in explaining 𝐿−, suggesting market sentiment to be 
relevant for the reduction of foreign investors' exposure to certain foreign markets – in 
moments in which risk aversion is greater, foreign agents repatriate their funds to their 
domestic economy. Additionally, growth differential is found to have a significant 
influence 𝐿−, as the decisions increase when the growth differential progresses in favor 
of the growth of the world economy. Finally, the results allow us to conclude that UMP 
is not found to exert any influence on this variable. 
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Finally, 𝐴− has VIX as a significant explanatory variable with a positive coefficient, 
suggesting that national agents decrease their foreign exposure during periods of higher 
risk aversion. However, table 16 and 17 present results contrary to what we would 
expect theoretically as growth differential was found to be negatively associated with 
𝐴−; institutional quality is also found to be negatively associated with 𝐴−. Additionally, 
the model gives us new insights regarding the 𝐴−  component: being a de facto capital 
inflow, this component was found to be negatively affected by monetary policy actions 
implemented in the course of the global financial crisis. This result could be particularly 
important if the hypothesis advanced by Janus & Riera-Crichton (2013) holds: because 
national agents are more well-informed and this type of inflow promotes growth more 
than asset bubbles, 𝐴− should be encouraged over 𝐿+. The results point that UMP pulled 
𝐿+ to NAE and pushed 𝐴− from them, which could indicate that monetary actions from 
the G4 central banks overflowed economies with the most dangerous type of inflow, 
possibly contributing for asset bubbles and other macro-economic unbalances. 
Employing our model to the four-way decomposition raised additional insights 
beyond the results and conclusions discussed on the previous sections. It should be 
highlighted that the determinants of the four-way decomposition differ with the 
component focused. Remembering that we previously found the VIX to be negatively 
related with net and gross inflows, decomposing those standard measures allows us to 
obtain additional understanding of how capital inflows react to changes in risk aversion. 
Our results support the idea that the decision of investing in NAE is not affected by risk 
aversion; contrarily, the decision of disinvesting follows positively changes on market 
sentiment - in other words, when the market sentiment moves towards higher risk 
aversion, foreign investors tend do decrease their exposure to NAE. Moreover, the 
importance of growth only seems to be important in explaining the decisions of 
investment in NAE – the positive relation between gross inflows and growth operates 
through the 𝐿+ . 
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Table 16 – Benchmark results for the four-way elements regarding non-advanced 
economies 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (31) (32) (33) 
VIX 
-0.0153 
(0.0120) 
0.0190 
(0.0035)*** 
0.0228 
(0.0043)*** 
Growth differential 
0.2287 
(0.0655)*** 
-0.0891 
(0.0372)** 
-0.2220 
(0.0431)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.5277 
(0.3629) 
-0.0275 
(0.0215) 
-0.0134 
(0.0374) 
Trade openness 
-0.0108 
(0.0277) 
0.0076 
(0.0121) 
0.0298 
(0.0170)* 
Institutional quality 
0.0573 
(0.0327)* 
-0.0006 
(0.0090) 
-0.0542 
(0.0149)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 877 877 877 
R-squared 0.412 0.218 0.299 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 17 – UMP results for the four-way elements regarding non-advanced economies 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (34) (35) (36) 
VIX 
-0.0084 
(0.0126 
0.0181 
(0.0037)*** 
0.0190 
(0.0040)*** 
Growth differential 
0.1998 
(0.0745)*** 
0.0866 
(0.0369)** 
-0.2085 
(0.0428)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.5682 
(0.3572) 
-0.0330 
(0.0240) 
-0.0307 
(0.0384) 
Trade openness 
-0.0150 
(0.0299) 
0.0035 
(0.0141) 
0.0261 
(0.0190) 
Institutional quality 
0.1305 
(0.0465)*** 
0.0022 
(0.0104) 
0.0589 
(0.0170)*** 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
5.9218 
(1.8079)*** 
-0.9746 
(0.6107) 
-3.2567 
(0.8788)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 771 771 771 
R-squared 0.412 0.234 0.342 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
The literature has been pointing the influence of UMP on net and capital inflows to 
NAE. Our work provides new insights to the literature by concluding that UMP 
positively influenced the decisions of investment by foreign agents on NAE. This 
conclusion represents additional support to the apprehension of NAE’s policy makers 
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regarding the pull effect of those monetary actions on capital inflows to NAE. 
Simultaneously, UMP exerted a negative effect on the repatriation of capital from 
domestic residents of NAE. It should be noted that Janus & Riera-Crichton (2013) 
introduced the hypothesis that even if 𝐿+ and 𝐴− are in fact capital inflows, they could 
have different effects on the output growth depending on the existence of asymmetric 
information between foreign and domestic investors. 
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5.5   Robustness checks 
In the previous sections we discussed the results produced given the framework 
provided by the literature. However, we should assess how the results change if we drop 
some assumptions regarding our model. 
We will start to evaluate the robustness of our results by modifying the specification 
of the UMP variable. Previously, we considered absolute changes in G4 central banks’ 
balance sheet. One could argue that the effect of policies with impact on the balance 
sheet of those institutions could depend on the initial value of the balance sheet. In order 
to check whether our conclusions would change, we regress again our models with the 
UMP variable being specified as the aggregate percentage variation of G4 central 
banks’ balance sheet. From table A16 to A19 we can see that the conclusions do not 
change with alternative specification, as the variable is highly significant. 
Additionally, we employed the use of dummy variables in order to control for 
seasonal effects. At this point it is pertinent to question how the results would change if 
the main equations were estimated without controlling for the seasonal effects. As can 
be seen in table A20 to A29, the results previously presented and discussed do not 
change significantly: trade openness regarding gross inflows to AE loses its 
significance. Regarding the UMP model, the only differences are related with the 
increase of significance of the VIX regarding net inflows to NAE and the loss of 
significance of the growth differential and institutional quality regarding gross inflows 
to AE. Finally, the results of the four-way decomposition only change in the sense 𝐿− is 
now negatively related with the UMP variable which enhances the conclusion that UMP 
pushed capital inflows to NAE. In other words, the results points in the direction that 
UMP decreased the decisions of foreign investors of disinvesting in NAE. 
Finally, a strong assumption under fixed effects is that unobserved effects are 
related with the characteristics of each economy in the sample. However, if this 
assumption does not hold and the unobserved effects are not related with the observable 
variables, random effects model would be the most adequate model. The literature 
studying the determinants of capital flows tends to accept that fixed effects model is the 
most suitable model as discussed in section 4.2; nonetheless, it appears to be accepted to 
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estimate the model as well by random effects and present both the results (see e.g. Nier 
et al., 2014) in order to assess how the results change from one model to the other. As 
can be seen in table A30 to A39, the results do not change significantly: institutional 
quality is no longer significant regarding net and gross inflows to AE. Additionally, 
trade openness loses its significance regarding gross inflows to AE but is now 
negatively related with net inflows to these economies. Regarding the UMP model, the 
VIX and trade openness are no longer significant regarding net and gross inflows, 
respectively. When looking to the AE, institutional quality loses its significance and 
trade openness turns to be negatively associated with net inflows. Regarding gross 
inflows, growth differential and institutional quality are no longer significant. Finally, 
regarding the four-way decomposition, the only change is related with institutional 
quality: is no longer significant related with 𝐴− but turns to be associated with 𝐿−. 
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6. Conclusion 
The global financial crisis presented itself as an enormous challenge regarding the 
monetary policy framework. Financial stress, negative output growth and deflationary 
pressures required central banks across the world to act firmly in order to counter act 
those risks. The monetary policy actions focused on short-term interest rate mechanisms 
in the early stages of the crisis, for as long as there was room to reduce short-term 
interest rates. However, as interest rates reached the zero lower bound, central banks 
implemented what has been denominated as unconventional monetary policies. These 
policies were argued to push capital inflows to NAE, contributing to the build-up of 
external imbalances. 
Regarding the determinants of capital flows, our findings suggest that NAE have the 
same determinants for both net and gross inflows – interest rate differential is the only 
variable that is not significant. When looking to AE there is some difference between 
the two measures of capital inflows with the sign of the VIX being the most substantial 
– it has a positive coefficient when associated with net inflows; on the other hand has a 
negative coefficient regarding gross inflows. Additionally, growth differential is 
significant regarding gross inflows but not regarding net; contrarily, interest rate 
differential is significant regarding net inflows but not regarding gross. At this point we 
should note that including in the sample both AE and NAE produce results that do 
reflect neither the experience of the former nor the latter. This way, interpreting the 
results when the sample consists of economies with possible different experiences may 
be inaccurate. 
Assessing at which extent it could be said that the determinants that explained 
capital flows in the pre-crisis period changed in the post-crisis period, our results point 
towards the direction that generally the same determinants in prior period were 
significant on the following. 
It was concluded for both NAE and AE that gross inflows are negatively affected by 
the VIX. Further insight regarding the determinants of capital inflows is provided by 
estimating the three elements of the four-way decomposition, as this effect seems to 
work through 𝐿− as this variable is positively related with risk aversion. For AE, this 
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effect offsets the negative effect of risk aversion on 𝐿+. We should also note that 𝐴+, 
which is a de facto inflow, has risk aversion as a significant variable with positive sign. 
Furthermore, the growth differential is relevant in explaining all the three components 
regarding NAE; regarding AE, the growth differential is only relevant for the 
component that accounts for the decisions of foreign agents in investing in those 
economies. 
Finally, we addressed the hypothesis that UMP affected capital flows or not. 
Regarding the quantitative measure of those policies, the results were clear enough to 
let us conclude for a positive effect of UMP on net and gross capital inflows, 
independently of the group of economies. Nonetheless, we should highlight the 
problems that may emerge from the use of a qualitative variable in assessing the impact 
of monetary announcements on capital flows: by using dummy variables around long-
term windows, potential bias could rise from the announcing of other significant news 
during the window around which the effects of the monetary announcement are 
measured. In this way, we argue that is more adequate to measure the UMP through 
quantitative variables that capture a particular effect rather than qualitative variables. 
We contribute for the literature that already tested the effect of UMP on capital 
flows by extending this hypothesis to the elements of the four-way decomposition. 
UMP affected gross inflows through the investment decisions of foreign investors, 𝐿+, 
but not through the disinvestment decisions of those agents, 𝐿−. Additionally, the effect 
of those policies promoted a decrease of capital repatriation, 𝐴−, from national agents. 
In other words, the inflows which caused apprehension in the resurge phase are those 
related with the increase of liabilities and not those related with the decrease of national 
agents’ exposition to external assets.  If domestic residents tend to be well-informed and 
their capital promotes output growth more than asset bubbles when comparing with 
foreign agents (Janus & Riera-Crichton, 2014), then unconventional monetary actions 
pushed to NAE the most dangerous component while pulled the component that 
contributes the most to output growth and financial stability. These results could be 
significant to policymakers in order to design and monitor effective capital controls as 
distinguishes the forms of inflows influenced by unconventional monetary actions.  
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To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that uses the four-way 
decomposition with the objective of assessing the determinants of capital flows through 
a different measure. If the literature evaluates that this decomposition raises additional 
understanding of the determinants of capital flows, it would be praised further study 
regarding this alternative measure of capital flows. 
Finally, inasmuch the results regarding the four-way decomposition provided by this 
study address a very important question that affects policy-making worldwide it is not 
understood at present how the four elements affect variables as the credit growth, 
exchange rates, or asset prices. Before understanding those channels it could be 
inaccurate to extrapolate and extract policy-making conclusions regarding the effect of 
unconventional monetary policies on those variables based on the results we present. 
Our results only point in the direction that unconventional monetary policies affected 
the elements of the four-way decomposition. Further work will require assessing the 
effect of those variables on the robustness of the financial system and macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
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Figure A1 - Capital Inflows to Emerging Asia 
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Figure A2 - Capital Inflows to Latin America 
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Figure A4 
Source: ECB, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html 
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Figure A3 - Capital Inflows to Emerging Europe, Middle East 
and Africa 
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Tables 
Table A1 – Summary description of the variables 
Variable Description Source 
Net capital 
inflows 
Difference between gross capital 
inflows and gross capital outflows in 
percentage of nominal GDP. 
Balance of Payments 
Statistics, 6th 
Gross capital 
inflows 
Changes on a country's stock of 
liabilities in a given period in 
percentage of nominal GDP. 
Balance of Payments 
Statistics, 6th 
L+ 
Absolute value of all increases in 
foreign liabilities from private domestic 
residents in the financial and capital 
accounts in percentage of nominal GDP. 
Balance of Payments 
Statistics, 6th 
L- 
Absolute value of all decreases in 
foreign liabilities from private domestic 
residents in the financial and capital 
accounts in percentage of nominal GDP. 
Balance of Payments 
Statistics, 6th 
A+ 
Defined as the absolute value of all 
increases in foreign assets from private 
domestic residents in the financial and 
capital accounts in percentage of 
nominal GDP. 
Balance of Payments 
Statistics, 6th 
A- 
Defined as the absolute value of all 
decreases in foreign assets from private 
domestic residents in the financial and 
capital accounts in percentage of 
nominal GDP. 
Balance of Payments 
Statistics, 6th 
GDP 
Quarterly nominal gross domestic 
product in US Dollars. 
IFS 
Interest rate 
differential 
Difference between a country's 3-month 
money market interest rate and an 
aggregate G4 interest rate, based on the 
3-month money market of each of the 
four countries and weighted by the GDP 
DataStream, IFS 
Growth 
differential 
Difference between a country's real 
growth over the homologous period and 
an aggregate G4 real growth, based on 
real growth of each of the four countries 
and weighted by the real GDP of those 
economies 
IFS 
VIX 
VIX Implied volatility on options on the 
S&P 500 Index. 
CBOE 
Trade openness 
Sum of imports and exports in 
percentage of nominal GDP. 
IFS 
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Institutional 
quality 
Average of six governance indicators 
that compose the World Governance 
Indicators 
World Governance 
Indicators 
Announcements 
Dummy variable equals 1 if at least two 
or more central banks announced 
monetary policies with impacts on the 
balance sheet. Dummy equals 0 in the 
remaining cases. 
BoE, BoJ, ECB, Federal 
Reserve 
Balance sheet 
variation 
Absolute or relative aggregate variation, 
in US dollars, of G4 central banks' 
balance sheet. 
BoE, BoJ, ECB, Federal 
Reserve 
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Table A2 - List of Federal Reserve monetary actions' announcements with impact on 
the balance sheet 
Date Program URL 
25-11-2008 QE1 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0081125b.htm 
16-12-2008 
QE1/extended 
language 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0081216b.htm 
28-01-2009 QE1 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0090128a.htm 
18-03-2009 
QE1/extended 
language 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0090318a.htm 
12-08-2009 
QE1 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0090812a.htm 
23-09-2009 
QE1 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0090923a.htm 
04-11-2009 
QE1 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0091104a.htm 
10-08-2010 
QE2 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0100810a.htm 
21-09-2010 
QE2 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0100921a.htm 
03-11-2010 
QE2 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0101103a.htm 
22-06-2011 
QE2 www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0110622a.htm 
09-08-2011 
Extended period 
language 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0110809a.htm 
21-09-2011 
Maturity 
Extension 
Program 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0110921a.htm 
25-01-2012 
Extended period 
language 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0120125a.htm 
20-06-2012 
Maturity 
Extension 
Program 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0120620a.htm 
13-09-2012 
QE3/extended 
period language 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0120913a.htm 
12-12-2012 
QE3/extended 
period language 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0121212a.htm 
18-12-2013 
Decrease of 
monthly asset 
acquisitions 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0131218a.htm 
29-01-2014 Decrease of www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
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monthly asset 
acquisitions 
0140129a.htm 
19-03-2014 
Decrease of 
monthly asset 
acquisitions 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0140319a.htm 
30-04-2014 
Decrease of 
monthly asset 
acquisitions 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0140430a.htm 
18-06-2014 
Decrease of 
monthly asset 
acquisitions 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0140618a.htm 
30-07-2014 
Decrease of 
monthly asset 
acquisitions 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0140730a.htm 
17-09-2014 
Decrease of 
monthly asset 
acquisitions 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2
0140917a.htm 
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Table A3 - List of ECB monetary actions' announcements with impact on the balance 
sheet 
Date Program URL 
28-03-2008 LTRO 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr080328.en.ht
ml 
15-10-2008 
Fixed-rate 
tender, full 
allotment 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2008/html/pr081015.en.ht
ml 
07-05-2009 CBPP/LTRO 
www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2009/html/is090507.en.
html 
10-05-2010 SMP 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.ht
ml 
30-06-2010 CBPP 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100630.en.ht
ml 
06-10-2011 CBPP2 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111006_3.en.
html 
08-12-2011 LTRO 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.
html 
06-09-2012 OMT 
www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.
html 
02-05-2013 
Fixed-rate full 
allotment MRO; 
3- month LTRO 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/htm
l/is130502.en.html 
07-11-2013 
Fixed-rate full 
allotment MRO; 
3- month LTRO 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/htm
l/is131107.en.html 
05-06-2014 
Targeted 
Longer-Term 
Refinancing 
Operations 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/htm
l/is140605.en.html 
04-09-2014 
ABSPP & 
CBPP3 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/htm
l/is140904.en.html 
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Table A4 - List of BoE monetary actions' announcements with impact on the balance 
sheet 
Date Program URL 
19-01-2009 APF 
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010852/
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_05_09.htm 
05-03-2009 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
009/019.aspx 
05-07-2009 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
009/037.aspx 
08-06-2009 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
009/063.aspx 
11-05-2009 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
009/081.aspx 
02-04-2010 APF www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/chx_letter_291111.pdf 
06-10-2011 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
010/008.aspx 
29-11-2011 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
011/092.aspx 
09-02-2012 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
012/008.aspx 
05-07-2012 APF 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2
012/066.aspx 
13-07-2012 
Funding Lending 
Scheme 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/n
ews/2012/067.aspx 
 
24-04-2013 
Funding Lending 
Scheme 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/n
ews/2013/061.aspx 
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Table A5 - List of BoJ monetary actions' announcements with impact on the balance 
sheet 
Date Program URL 
02-12-2008 SFSOs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2008/un08
12b.pdf 
19-12-2008 
Outright 
JGB/CFI 
purchases 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2008/k081
219.pdf 
22-01-2009 
Outright CFI 
purchases 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/mok
0901a.pdf 
19-02-2009 
Outright CFI 
purchases 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/mok
0902b.pdf 
18-03-2009 
Outright 
JGB/CFI 
purchases 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/k090
318.pdf 
15-07-2009 
Outright CFI 
purchases/SFSO
s 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/k090
715.pdf 
30-10-2009 
Outright CFI 
purchases/SFSO
s 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/k091
030.pdf 
01-12-2009 FROs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2009/k091
201.pdf 
17-03-2010 FROs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2010/k100
317.pdf 
21-05-2010 GSFF 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2010/k100
521.pdf 
30-08-2010 FROs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2010/k100
830.pdf 
05-10-2010 APP 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2010/k101
005.pdf 
14-03-2011 APP 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2011/k110
314a.pdf 
14-06-2011 GSFF 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2011/k110
614a.pdf 
04-08-2011 APP/FROs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2011/k110
804a.pdf 
27-10-2011 APP 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2011/k111
027a.pdf 
14-02-2012 APP 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k120
214a.pdf 
13-03-2012 GSFF 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k120
313a.pdf 
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27-04-2012 APP/FROs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k120
427a.pdf 
12-07-2012 APP/FROs 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k120
712a.pdf 
19-09-2012 APP 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k120
919a.pdf 
30-10-2012 APP/SBLF 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k121
030a.pdf 
20-12-2012 APP 
www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k121
220a.pdf 
22-01-2013 APP 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_201
3/k130122a.pdf 
04-04-2013 
Introduction of 
QQME 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_201
3/k130404a.pdf 
19-11-2014 APP 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_201
4/k141119a.pdf 
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Table A6 – Sample 
Non advanced economies Advanced Economies 
Argentina Australia 
Brazil Austria 
Bulgaria Belgium 
Chile Canada 
China Denmark 
Colombia Finland 
Croatia France 
Czech Republic Germany 
Ecuador Greece 
Egypt Israel 
Estonia Italy 
Hungary Japan 
India Netherlands 
Indonesia New Zealand 
Latvia Norway 
Lithuania Spain 
Malaysia Sweden 
Mexico Switzerland 
Morocco United Kingdom 
Peru United States 
Philippines  
Poland  
Romania  
Russia  
Servia  
Slovak Republic  
Slovenia  
South Africa  
South Korea  
Thailand  
Turkey  
Ukraine  
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Table A7 – Pre and post-crisis regressions for all the economies’ net inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q4 
Equation: (A1) (A2) 
VIX 
0.0315 
(0.0087)*** 
0.0162 
(0.0081)** 
Growth differential 
-0.0674 
(0.1508) 
-0.1504 
(0.1070) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0188 
(0.0475) 
-0.3828 
(0.2851) 
Trade openness 
-0.0592 
(0.0443) 
-0.0838 
(0.0323) 
Institutional quality 
0.1188 
(0.0547)** 
0.1956 
(0.0507)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 656 949 
R-squared 0.62 0.289 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A8 – Pre and post-crisis regressions for all the economies’ gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2008Q3 2008Q4-2014Q4 
Equation: (A3) (A4) 
VIX 
-0.0544 
(0.0261)** 
-0.0271 
(0.0205) 
Growth differential 
-0.2569 
(0.4432) 
0.0561 
(0.2502) 
Interest rate differential 
0.5318 
(0.3620) 
-0.0434 
(0.4957) 
Trade openness 
0.0528 
(0.0948) 
0.0201 
(0.0683) 
Institutional quality 
0.0276 
(0.1207) 
0.2584 
(0.1282) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 656 949 
R-squared 0.382 0.125 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A9 – Net and gross inflows to non-advanced economies controlling for the 
Federal Reserve announcements 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A5) (A6) 
VIX 
-0.0221 
(0.0079)*** 
-0.0491 
(0.0160)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6166 
(0.0875)*** 
0.8657 
(0.1297)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0002 
(0.0689) 
0.5836 
(0.3963) 
Trade openness 
-0.1588 
(0.0274)*** 
-0.1861 
(0.0458) 
Institutional quality 
0.0743 
(0.0303)*** 
0.1369 
(0.0488)*** 
UMP variables   
FED announcements 
-0.0046 
(0.0045) 
-0.0213 
(0.0081)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 867 871 
R-squared 0.338 0.291 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A10 – Net and gross inflows to advanced economies controlling for the Federal 
Reserve announcements 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A7) (A8) 
VIX 
0.0293 
(0.0101)*** 
-0.1343 
(0.0317)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.0410 
(0.1653) 
0.9631 
(0.4625)** 
Interest rate differential 
0.6266 
(0.2799)** 
0.3035 
(0.8992) 
Trade openness 
-0.0348 
(0.0396) 
-0.2698 
(0.1655) 
Institutional quality 
0.1010 
(0.0440)** 
0.2620 
(0.1515)*** 
UMP variables   
FED announcements 
0.0010 
(0.0067) 
-0.0578 
(0.0176)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 719 719 
R-squared 0.305 0.175 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A11 – Net and gross inflows to all the economies controlling for the Federal 
Reserve announcements 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A9) (A10) 
VIX 
0.0052 
(0.0062) 
-0.0905 
(0.0178)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.0007 
(0.0763) 
0.1014 
(0.1824) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0646 
(0.0890) 
0.6074 
(0.3325)* 
Trade openness 
-0.0939 
(0.0247)*** 
-0.2054 
(0.0572)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.1128 
(0.0244)*** 
0.2474 
(0.0636)*** 
UMP variables   
FED announcements 
-0.0050 
(0.0041) 
-0.0488 
(0.0097)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 1605 1605 
R-squared 0.299 0.161 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A12 – Benchmark results for the four-way elements regarding all the economies 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A11) (A12) (A13) 
VIX 
-0.0371 
(0.0116)*** 
0.0596 
(0.0121)*** 
0.0641 
(0.0130)*** 
Growth differential 
0.1089 
(0.0984) 
-0.1131 
(0.0867) 
-0.1122 
(0.0963) 
Interest rate differential 
0.4679 
(0.3199) 
-0.1524 
(0.0698)** 
-0.1000 
(0.0757) 
Trade openness 
-0.1003 
(0.0426)** 
0.0247 
(0.0235) 
0.0386 
(0.0237) 
Institutional quality 
0.0648 
(0.0508) 
-0.1154 
(0.0333)*** 
-0.1167 
(0.0299)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1606 1606 1606 
R-squared 0.382 0.26 0.244 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A13 – UMP results for the four-way elements regarding all the economies 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: All the economies All the economies All the economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A14) (A15) (A16) 
VIX 
-0.0072 
(0.0129) 
0.0469 
(0.0112)*** 
0.0534 
(0.0118)*** 
Growth differential 
0.0709 
(0.1010) 
-0.0648 
(0.0946) 
-0.0529 
(0.1029) 
Interest rate differential 
0.4661 
(0.3278) 
-0.1700 
(0.0826)* 
-0.1410 
(0.0872) 
Trade openness 
-0.0744 
(0.0459) 
-0.0232 
(0.0317) 
-0.0004 
(0.0305) 
Institutional quality 
0.1201 
(0.0634)* 
-0.1377 
(0.0436)*** 
-0.1313 
(0.0386)*** 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
11.3806 
(2.0262)*** 
-5.3644 
(2.2300)** 
-6.8285 
(2.2664)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1400 1400 1400 
R-squared 0.385 0.28 0.276 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A14 – Benchmark results for the four-way elements regarding the advanced 
economies 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A17) (A18) (A19) 
VIX 
-0.0569 
(0.0189)*** 
0.1016 
(0.0244)*** 
0.1126 
(0.0281)*** 
Growth differential 
0.7306 
(0.3474)** 
-0.4024 
(0.2803) 
-0.4394 
(0.2797) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0106 
(0.5981) 
-0.1501 
(0.5386) 
-0.2893 
(0.5862) 
Trade openness 
-0.3185 
(0.1564)** 
-0.0355 
(0.0793) 
-0.0306 
(0.0705) 
Institutional quality 
0.0298 
(0.1234) 
-0.2605 
(0.0842)*** 
-0.1156 
('0.0774) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 719 719 719 
R-squared 0.307 0.252 0.246 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A15 – UMP results for the four-way elements regarding advanced economies 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A20) (A21) (A22) 
VIX 
-0.0091 
(0.0225) 
0.0696 
(0.0214)*** 
0.0887 
(0.0248)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6093 
(0.3740) 
-0.2269 
(0.3090) 
-0.3235 
(0.3047) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.1316 
(0.6346) 
0.0751 
(0.6798) 
-0.0971 
(0.7222) 
Trade openness 
-0.3247 
(0.1613)** 
-0.1942 
(0.1199) 
-0.1691 
(0.1086) 
Institutional quality 
0.0128 
(0.1442) 
-0.3143 
(0.1072)*** 
-0.1364 
(0.0987) 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
17.0362 
(3.9098)*** 
-11.3504 
(4.6417)** 
-11.1261 
(4.6713)** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 619 619 619 
R-squared 0.308 0.272 0.275 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A16 – Robustness check: relative expansion of G4 balance sheet regarding non-
advanced economies’ net and gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A23) (A24) 
VIX 
-0.0190 
(0.0085)** 
-0.0190 
(0.0085)** 
Growth differential 
0.5877 
(0.0989)*** 
0.9056 
(0.1495)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0211 
(0.0762) 
0.6659 
(0.3964)* 
Trade openness 
-0.1806 
(0.0309)*** 
-0.1858 
(0.0549)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0638 
(0.0323)** 
0.2377 
(0.0717)*** 
UMP variables   
Relative Expansion of 
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
0.2217 
(0.0703)*** 
0.5261 
(0.1323)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 867 867 
R-squared 0.295 0.265 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A17 – Robustness check: relative expansion of G4 balance sheet regarding non-
advanced economies’ four-way elements 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A25) (A26) (A27) 
VIX 
-0.0041 
(0.0121) 
0.0226 
('0.0063)*** 
0.0217 
(0.0067)*** 
Growth differential 
0.2595 
(0.0863)*** 
-0.0497 
(0.0535) 
-0.2138 
(0.0595)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.5718 
(0.3354)* 
-0.1012 
(0.0631) 
-0.0794 
(0.0887) 
Trade openness 
-0.0022 
(0.0314) 
0.0040 
(0.0240) 
0.0310 
(0.0264) 
Institutional quality 
0.1454 
(0.0541)*** 
-0.0186 
(0.0186) 
-0.0999 
(0.0264)*** 
UMP variable:    
Relative Expansion of 
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
0.2991 
(0.0882)*** 
-0.0151 
(0.0431) 
-0.1364 
(0.0516)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 746 746 746 
R-squared 0.409 0.23 0.347 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A18 – Robustness check: relative expansion of G4 balance sheet regarding 
advanced economies’ net and gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A28) (A29) 
VIX 
0.0325 
(0.0109)*** 
-0.0717 
(0.0341)** 
Growth differential 
-0.0041 
(0.1828) 
0.9438 
(0.5048)* 
Interest rate differential 
0.3525 
(0.3102) 
-0.0579 
(1.1119) 
Trade openness 
-0.0800 
(0.0546) 
-0.1144 
(0.2248) 
Institutional quality 
0.1070 
(0.0542)** 
0.3362 
(0.1805)* 
UMP variables   
Relative Expansion of 
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
0.0433 
(0.0861) 
1.4304 
(0.2813)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 867 867 
R-squared 0.276 0.166 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A19 – Robustness check: relative expansion of G4 balance sheet regarding 
advanced economies’ four-way elements 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A30) (A31) (A32) 
VIX 
-0.0070 
(0.0227) 
0.0647 
(0.0212)*** 
0.0856 
(0.0246)*** 
Growth differential 
0.7147 
(0.3836)* 
-0.2291 
(0.3184) 
-0.3390 
(0.3121) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0474 
(0.7005) 
0.0104 
(0.7357) 
-0.1647 
(0.7838) 
Trade openness 
-0.3473 
(0.1681)** 
-0.2329 
(0.1251)* 
-0.1958 
(0.1137)* 
Institutional quality 
0.0239 
(0.1492) 
-0.3123 
(0.1146)*** 
-0.1322 
(0.1052) 
UMP variable:    
Relative Expansion of 
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
0.8756 
(0.1846)*** 
-0.5548 
(0.2129)*** 
-0.5407 
(0.2144)** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 783 783 783 
R-squared 0.322 0.277 0.28 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A20 – Robustness check: benchmark results not controlling for seasonal effects 
regarding non-advanced economies’ net and gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A33) (A34) 
VIX 
-0.0258 
(0.0077)*** 
-0.0601 
(0.0160)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6304 
(0.0876)*** 
0.9167 
(0.1267)*** 
Interest rate 
differential 
0.0065 
(0.0668) 
0.5726 
(0.3982) 
Trade openness 
-0.1585 
(0.0272)*** 
-0.1914 
(0.0459)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0735 
(0.0304)** 
0.1362 
(0.0488)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No 
Observations 867 867 
R-squared 0.334 0.284 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A21 – Robustness check: benchmark results not controlling for seasonal effects 
regarding advanced economies’ net and gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A35) (A36) 
VIX 
0.0289 
(0.0098)*** 
-0.1752 
(0.0336)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.0398 
(0.1684) 
1.1920 
(0.4697)** 
Interest rate 
differential 
0.6420 
(0.2776)** 
0.3628 
(0.9084) 
Trade openness 
-0.0349 
(0.0399) 
-0.2725 
(0.1786) 
Institutional quality 
0.0996 
(0.0428)** 
0.2754 
(0.1505)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No 
Observations 867 867 
R-squared 0.304 0.121 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A22 – Robustness check: UMP results without controlling for seasonal effects 
regarding non-advanced economies’ net inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A37) (A38) 
VIX 
-0.0222 
(0.0082)*** 
-0.0163 
(0.0087)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6202 
(0.0958)*** 
0.5856 
(0.0890)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0008 
(0.0714) 
0.0084 
(0.0667) 
Trade openness 
-0.1806 
(0.0302)*** 
-0.1555 
(0.0269)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0647 
(0.0316)** 
0.0766 
(0.0301)** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
4.2601 
(1.4783)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0137 
(0.0048)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.339 0.339 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A23 – Robustness check: UMP results without controlling for seasonal effects 
regarding non-advanced economies’ gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A39) (A40) 
VIX 
-0.0490 
(0.0174)*** 
-0.0365 
(0.0173)*** 
Growth differential 
0.8739 
(0.1384)*** 
0.8059 
(0.1328)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.6182 
(0.4005) 
0.5772 
(0.3875) 
Trade openness 
-0.2096 
(0.0518)*** 
-0.1839 
(0.0456)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.1911 
(0.0616)*** 
0.1442 
(0.0489)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
10.3220 
(2.6632)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0339 
(0.0085)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.293 0.298 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A24 – Robustness check: UMP results not controlling for seasonal effects 
regarding advanced economies’ net inflows 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A41) (A42) 
VIX 
0.0313 
(0.0106)*** 
0.0320 
(0.0111)*** 
Growth differential 
-0.0136 
(0.1777) 
-0.0583 
(0.1693) 
Interest rate differential 
0.3264 
(0.2897) 
0.6362 
(0.2791)** 
Trade openness 
-0.0722 
(0.0537) 
-0.0345 
(0.0398) 
Institutional quality 
0.1050 
(0.0516)** 
0.0977 
(0.0433)** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
0.8241 
(1.7949) 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0041 
(0.0062) 
Seasonally controlled No No 
Observations 619 719 
R-squared 0.275 0.304 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A25 – Robustness check: UMP results not controlling for seasonal effects 
regarding advanced economies’ gross inflows 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A43) (A44) 
VIX 
-0.0904 
(0.0351)** 
-0.0963 
(0.0357)*** 
Growth differential 
0.8802 
(0.5031)* 
0.7084 
(0.4670) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0479 
(0.9995) 
0.2136 
(0.8878) 
Trade openness 
-0.1248 
(0.2225) 
-0.2602 
(0.1759) 
Institutional quality 
0.3018 
(0.1740)* 
0.2264 
(0.1506) 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
25.5426 
(6.0352)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.1080 
(0.0186)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No 
Observations 619 719 
R-squared 0.119 0.151 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A26 – Robustness check: benchmark model applied to non-advanced economies’ 
four-way elements not controlling for seasonal effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A45) (A46) (A47) 
VIX 
-0.0146 
(0.0118) 
0.0191 
(0.0035)*** 
0.0226 
(0.0043)*** 
Growth differential 
0.2263 
(0.0656)*** 
-0.0882 
(0.0369)** 
-0.2182 
(0.0433)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.5280 
(0.3558) 
-0.0260 
(0.0223) 
-0.0079 
(0.0413) 
Trade openness 
-0.0128 
(0.0276) 
0.0068 
(0.0120) 
0.0288 
(0.0172)* 
Institutional quality 
0.0588 
(0.0329)* 
-0.0007 
(0.0089) 
-0.0547 
(0.0148)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No No 
Observations 867 867 867 
R-squared 0.408 0.235 0.295 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A27 – Robustness check: benchmark model applied to advanced economies’ 
four-way elements not controlling for seasonal effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A48) (A49) (A50) 
VIX 
-0.0674 
(0.0196)*** 
0.1077 
(0.0256)*** 
0.1180 
(0.0295)*** 
Growth differential 
0.7621 
(0.3493)** 
-0.4298 
(0.2779) 
-0.4641 
(0.2819) 
Interest rate differential 
0.1569 
(0.6125) 
-0.2059 
(0.5372) 
-0.3345 
(0.5891) 
Trade openness 
-0.3238 
(0.1645)** 
-0.0513 
(0.0794) 
-0.0460 
(0.0710) 
Institutional quality 
0.0199 
(0.1268) 
-0.2555 
(0.0829)*** 
-0.1112 
(0.0773) 
Seasonally controlled No No No 
Observations 719 719 719 
R-squared 0.272 0.229 0.225 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A28 – Robustness check: UMP results regarding non-advanced economies’ four-
way elements not controlling for seasonal effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A51) (A52) (A53) 
VIX 
-0.0078 
(0.0126) 
0.0182 
(0.0037)*** 
0.0190 
(0.0040)*** 
Growth differential 
0.2017 
(0.0744)*** 
-0.0838 
(0.0365)** 
-0.2040 
(0.0425)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.5658 
(0.3518) 
-0.0339 
(0.0244) 
-0.0295 
(0.0400) 
Trade openness 
-0.0171 
(0.0299) 
0.0024 
(0.0140) 
0.0250 
(0.0190) 
Institutional quality 
0.1323 
(0.0469)*** 
0.0016 
(0.0104) 
-0.0593 
(0.0168)*** 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
5.5006 
(1.7773)*** 
-1.2026 
(0.6109)** 
-3.4935 
(0.8629)*** 
Seasonally controlled No No No 
Observations 771 771 771 
R-squared 0.437 0.252 0.347 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A29 – Robustness check: UMP results regarding advanced economies’ four-way 
elements not controlling for seasonal effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
Sample: Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A54) (A55) (A56) 
VIX 
-0.0158 
(0.0235) 
0.0745 
(0.0221)*** 
0.0928 
(0.0259)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6357 
(0.3771)* 
-0.2445 
(0.3081) 
-0.3381 
(0.3071) 
Interest rate differential 
0.0076 
(0.6292) 
0.0555 
(0.6733) 
-0.1030 
(0.7203) 
Trade openness 
-0.3319 
(0.1660)** 
-0.2071 
(0.1226)* 
-0.1828 
(0.1109)* 
Institutional quality 
-0.0031 
(0.1462) 
-0.3049 
(0.1056)*** 
-0.1287 
(0.0979) 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
14.6128 
(3.8049)*** 
-10.9299 
(4.7191)*** 
-10.8928 
(4.7248)** 
Seasonally controlled No No No 
Observations 619 619 619 
R-squared 0.283 0.252 0.255 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A30 – Robustness check: estimation of the benchmark model regarding non-
advanced using random effects 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A57) (A58) 
VIX 
-0.0211 
(0.0080)*** 
-0.0548 
(0.0164)*** 
Growth differential 
0.5785 
(0.0876)*** 
0.9039 
(0.1345)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0215 
(0.0771) 
0.4749 
(0.3945) 
Trade openness 
-0.0846 
(0.0175)*** 
-0.0274 
(0.0252) 
Institutional quality 
0.0573 
(0.0129)*** 
0.0771 
(0.0148)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 867 867 
R-squared 0.127 0.12 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A31 – Robustness check: estimation of the benchmark model regarding advanced 
using random effects 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A59) (A60) 
VIX 
0.0260 
(0.0101)** 
-0.1557 
(0.0293)*** 
Growth differential 
0.0077 
(0.1580) 
0.9842 
(0.4370)** 
Interest rate differential 
0.7225 
(0.2873)** 
-0.0226 
(0.7604) 
Trade openness 
-0.0459 
(0.0225)** 
0.0401 
(0.0489) 
Institutional quality 
-0.0181 
(0.0182) 
0.0241 
(0.0289) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 719 719 
R-squared 0.055 0.118 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A32 – Robustness check: estimation of the UMP model regarding non-advanced 
economies’ net inflows using random effects 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A61) (A62) 
VIX 
-0.0141 
(0.0086) 
-0.0125 
(0.0090) 
Growth differential 
0.5269 
(0.0948)*** 
0.5276 
(0.0884)*** 
Interest rate differential 
-0.0250 
(0.0852) 
-0.0129 
(0.0737) 
Trade openness 
-0.0827 
(0.0172)*** 
-0.0820 
(0.0172)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0526 
(0.0134)*** 
0.0557 
(0.0127)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
5.1682 
(1.4951)*** 
 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0145 
(0.0050)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.136 0.133 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A33 – Robustness check: estimation of the UMP model regarding non-advanced 
economies’ gross inflows using random effects 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Non-advanced economies Non-advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A63) (A64) 
VIX 
-0.0344 
(0.0166)** 
-0.0277 
(0.0168) 
Growth differential 
0.7268 
(0.1368)*** 
0.7548 
(0.1377)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.4820 
(0.4252) 
0.5064 
(0.3719) 
Trade openness 
-0.0313 
(0.0263) 
-0.0303 
(0.0251) 
Institutional quality 
0.0731 
(0.0157)*** 
0.0768 
(0.0149)*** 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
11.7151 
(2.7591)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0465 
(0.0101)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 764 867 
R-squared 0.133 0.143 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A34 – Robustness check: estimation of the UMP model regarding advanced 
economies’ net inflows using random effects 
Dependent variable: Net inflows Net inflows 
Model: Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A65) (A66) 
VIX 
0.0310 
(0.0110)*** 
0.0304 
(0.0112)*** 
Growth differential 
0.0234 
(0.1628) 
-0.0188 
(0.1613) 
Interest rate differential 
0.3488 
(0.3039) 
0.7151 
(0.2876)** 
Trade openness 
-0.0496 
(0.0245)** 
-0.0457 
(0.0230)** 
Institutional quality 
-0.0166 
(0.0184) 
-0.0172 
(0.0188) 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
1.0073 
(1.8572) 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0063 
(0.0067) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 619 719 
R-squared 0.046 0.056 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A35 – Robustness check: estimation of the UMP model regarding advanced 
economies’ gross inflows using random effects 
Dependent variable: Gross inflows Gross inflows 
Model: Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Advanced economies Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q4 2005Q1-2014Q4 
Equation: (A67) (A68) 
VIX 
-0.0770 
(0.0302)** 
-0.1016 
(0.0340)*** 
Growth differential 
0.5475 
(0.4378) 
0.6910 
(0.4424) 
Interest rate differential 
0.1158 
(0.7895) 
-0.0143 
(0.7653) 
Trade openness 
0.0257 
(0.0443) 
0.0417 
(0.0480) 
Institutional quality 
0.0206 
(0.0267) 
0.0228 
(0.0292) 
UMP variables:   
G4 Central Banks Balance 
Sheet 
29.8745 
(6.1222)*** 
 
UMP Announcements  
-0.0794 
(0.0208) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes 
Observations 619 719 
R-squared 0.118 0.133 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A36 – Robustness check: estimation of non-advanced economies’ four-way 
elements using random effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Random effects Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A69) (A70) (A71) 
VIX 
-0.0124 
(0.0117) 
0.0194 
(0.0035)*** 
0.0232 
(0.0047)*** 
Growth differential 
0.2080 
(0.0628)*** 
-0.0954 
(0.0362)*** 
-0.2302 
(0.0433)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.4659 
(0.3662) 
-0.0295 
(0.0227) 
-0.0114 
(0.0333) 
Trade openness 
0.0311 
(0.0176)* 
0.0066 
(0.0041) 
0.0249 
(0.0074)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0431 
(0.0150)*** 
0.0074 
(0.0029)** 
-0.0006 
(0.0038) 
Seasonally controlled No No No 
Observations 719 719 719 
R-squared 0.129 0.389 0.418 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A37 – Robustness check: estimation of advanced economies’ four-way 
components using random effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Random effects Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A72) (A73) (A74) 
VIX 
-0.0465 
(0.0181)** 
0.1090 
(0.0254)*** 
0.1166 
(0.0285)*** 
Growth differential 
0.6266 
(0.3616)* 
-0.6058 
(0.2880)** 
-0.4864 
(0.2694)* 
Interest rate differential 
-0.3482 
(0.6456) 
-0.1703 
(0.4408) 
-0.3209 
(0.5193) 
Trade openness 
0.0599 
(0.0638) 
0.1271 
(0.0376)*** 
0.0921 
(0.0375)** 
Institutional quality 
0.0427 
(0.0465) 
-0.0159 
(0.0215) 
-0.0008 
(0.0228) 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 719 719 719 
R-squared 0.068 0.138 0.134 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A38 – Robustness check: estimation of the UMP model regarding the non-
advanced economies’ four-way elements using random effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Random effects Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Non-advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A75) (A76) (A77) 
VIX 
-0.0051 
(0.0118) 
0.0184 
(0.0037)*** 
0.0200 
(0.0047)*** 
Growth differential 
0.1848 
(0.0681)*** 
-0.0960 
(0.0380)** 
-0.2236 
(0.0446)*** 
Interest rate differential 
0.5220 
(0.3655) 
-0.0312 
(0.0239) 
-0.0255 
(0.0328) 
Trade openness 
0.0307 
(0.0184)* 
0.0072 
(0.0044) 
0.0275 
(0.0087)*** 
Institutional quality 
0.0532 
(0.0161)*** 
0.0083 
(0.0030)*** 
-0.0004 
(0.0045) 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
6.0302 
(1.8359)*** 
-0.9928 
(0.6387) 
-3.0278 
(0.7898)*** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 766 745 747 
R-squared 0.113 0.159 0.199 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
  
136 
 
Table A39 – Robustness check: estimation of the UMP model regarding the advanced 
economies’ four-way elements using random effects 
Dependent variable: L+ L- A- 
Model: Random effects Random effects Random effects 
Sample: Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Advanced 
economies 
Period: 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 2005Q1-2014Q14 
Equation: (A78) (A79) (A80) 
VIX 
0.0159 
(0.0199) 
0.0945 
(0.0243)*** 
0.1070 
(0.0267)*** 
Growth differential 
0.4085 
(0.3772) 
-0.5109 
(0.3074)* 
-0.4202 
(0.2911) 
Interest rate differential 
-0.4941 
(0.7043) 
-0.2599 
(0.5282) 
-0.4259 
(0.6214) 
Trade openness 
0.0935 
(0.0659) 
0.1323 
(0.0435)*** 
0.0967 
(0.0431)** 
Institutional quality 
0.0289 
(0.0476) 
-0.0189 
(0.0244) 
-0.0018 
(0.0257) 
UMP variable:    
G4 Central Banks 
Balance Sheet 
18.7745 
(4.0871)*** 
-10.1148 
(4.5716)** 
-10.2462 
(4.6345)** 
Seasonally controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 619 619 619 
R-squared 0.073 0.133 0.140 
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis. Dependent variable in % of GDP. * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
